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Consumers may regulate their emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli in 
order to depend less on their emotions to make product judgments and choices. 
However, this research suggests that under certain circumstances, regulating emotion 
may paradoxically increase the reliance on it.  
Building on the consensual model of emotion regulation, this research 
examines two important emotion regulatory strategies that consumers may apply at 
different stages of the emotion generative process, namely, the reappraisal strategy 
and the suppression strategy. The reappraisal strategy refers to the interpretation of a 
stimulus from a neutral and detached perspective so as to decrease the emotional 
relevance of the stimulus, whereas the suppression strategy refers to the inhibition of 
ongoing emotional response tendencies toward a stimulus during the emotion 
generative process. Experiment 1 compares the resource requirement of these two 
strategies and establishes the premise that emotion suppression consumes appreciable 
cognitive resources whereas reappraisal does not. The subsequent experiments show 
that, as a result of its requisite cognitive inputs, suppressing emotional reactions may 
impair consumers’ ability to process product information systematically (experiments 
2 and 3) as well as induce consumers to make emotion-based choices (experiments 4 
and 5). These findings contrast the popular notion that managing emotions should 
result in rational judgments that are based on objective product information. Moreover, 
demonstrating that the nonuse of feelings could have an impact on consumer judgment, 
this research complements previous research on how the use of feelings influences 
consumer judgment to provide a more complete theoretical account of the impact of 
feelings on consumer judgment.  





People may believe that they can be more objective by managing their 
emotions. Such belief dates back to ancient Greece when Plato posed emotion against 
reason in his philosophical discussion (Plato/Bloom 1991). It is also reflected in the 
psychoanalysis of the conflict between the pleasure principle (satisfying immediate, 
hedonic motives) and the reality principle (achieving long-term benefits; Freud 1911). 
Consumers nowadays may again attempt to control their emotional reactions toward 
enticing products to reduce impulsive purchase decisions (Hoch and Loewenstein 
1991; Kacen and Lee 2002; Rook 1987).  
The marketplace is abundant with products appealing to consumers’ emotions, 
ranging from tempting desserts, cute lifestyle products, stylish electronic appliances, 
to fashionable clothes. However, consumers may not always want to rely on their 
emotions when evaluating and choosing products (e.g., Adaval 2001; Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 1999). Yet one problem inherent in the nonuse of emotions is that 
emotions are associated with motivational impact and action tendency (Bargh 1999; 
Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Frijda 1986). Consumers who feel good about a product may have 
an inclination to approach the product. Because of this, it is unlikely that they can 
discard their emotions as a piece of unimportant product information effortlessly. 
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Rather, they may adopt various strategies to regulate their emotional reactions toward 
products to avoid emotion-driven purchase decisions (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; 
Kacen and Lee 2002). For example, consumers who are on diet may suppress their 
desire for a piece of delicious cheese cake; similarly, consumers who are considering 
a digital camera may try to evaluate it based on its functional features and down-play 
their positive feelings toward its sleek design. Failure to regulate emotional reactions 
toward products may lead to impulsive buying decisions which consumers regret later 
on (Rook 1987; Weinberg and Gottwald 1982). 
When consumers regulate their emotions, they may believe that they would be 
able to focus on the non-emotional product information such as the product’s 
utilitarian functions, and hence adopt a less emotion-laden processing frame. The 
current research, however, suggests that the consequences of regulating emotional 
reactions toward marketing stimuli are not as straightforward, as there may be costs 
associated with emotion regulation. Under certain circumstances, emotion regulation 
may impair product judgment and, consequently, lead to an ironically emotion-based 
choice. So, one important objective of this research is to provide contrary evidence 
that consumers can always be more objective in their judgments and choices by 
managing their emotions. The research also specifically details the explanations for 
why the regulation of emotions may have an impact on consumer judgment and 
identifies conditions under which this is likely to happen. These attempts represent an 
effort to bridge a gap in the literature on the impact of feelings on consumer judgment. 
In the following sections, the gap in the literature on feelings and consumer 
judgment is identified and the motivation for this research is presented. Next an 
overview of the research framework is provided. 
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1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
 
An accumulating body of research has demonstrated that feelings1  have a 
pervasive impact on judgment. Feelings may serve as judgment heuristics (Slovic et al. 
2002), as well as valuable information cues (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 1996; Pham 
1998, 2004). Moreover, previous research has identified the conditions under which 
feelings would be incorporated into product judgments. First, consumers need to 
perceive the product being evaluated as the actual source of their feelings (Strack 
1992). If their feelings are attributed to sources other than the product being evaluated, 
they would cease to influence judgments (Gorn, Goldberg, and Basu 1993; Schwarz 
and Clore 1983). Second, consumers need to regard their feelings as a relevant basis 
for evaluating the product. In this regard, feelings would serve as informational input 
for product judgments under situations where consumers use hedonic criteria (i.e., 
how it feels to use the product) to evaluate the product, but not under situations where 
consumers use utilitarian criteria (i.e., how good the product function is) to evaluate 
the product (Pham 1998). Note that although in most of the previous studies, 
                                                        
1
 Research on feelings and judgment has sometimes used the terms affect, emotion, and feeling 
interchangeably. Following previous research (Forgas 1995; Gross 1998; Larsen and Prizmic 2001; 
Pham et al. 2001; Scherer 1984; Schwarz and Clore 1996), the current research defines these 
terms as follows. Affect is a generic term used for all kinds of valenced states, including emotion, 
mood, emotional episodes, as well as affective dispositions. Both emotion and mood fall under the 
overarching category of affect, but compared to mood, emotion has a more specific referent and 
higher intensity. Feeling, as used in most consumer behavior research (e.g., Pham 1998; Pham et 
al. 2001), refers to affective response that encompasses extraneous mood and emotional reaction; 
nevertheless, feeling may include physiological response or metacognitive experience such as 
feeling of familiarity as well (Schwarz and Clore 1996). The current research mainly uses the term 
emotion because the research focus is on the regulation of stimulus-based affective response 
toward marketing stimuli which, unlike mood, has a specific referent. Note such emotional 
reactions toward marketing stimuli may be subtler than a specific type of emotion (e.g., joy, anger). 
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participants’ feelings were induced extrinsically by mood induction procedures (as 
opposed to feelings generated intrinsically from products and advertisements), the 
findings have implications for the use of feelings in judgments in general, regardless 
of how these feelings are elicited.  
Thus, previous research seems to imply that feelings would have an impact on 
product judgment only when consumers intend to rely on their feelings. For such 
instances, consumers who feel positively about a product may judge the product more 
favorably than those who feel negatively about it. On the other hand, when consumers 
do not intend to rely on their feelings, they can make product judgments based on the 
objective product information as if their feelings toward the product do no exist at all. 
In other words, the nonuse of feelings is assumed to be effortless. However, the 
validity of this assumption has remained relatively unexplored. To this end, little 
consumer behavior research has tapped into the process underlying the nonuse of 
feelings, let alone investigating the consequent impact on consumer judgment. 
Such investigation is of theoretical interest because of the emotion regulation 
process that is involved and the consequent effect on product judgment and choice (as 
compared with other forms of self-regulation behaviors). When both feelings for and 
functional evaluations of a product become likely inputs to product judgment and 
choice, consumers’ attempts to regulate their feelings (so that they can rely less on it) 
can affect product judgment and choice in two ways: first, through the reduction of 
feelings toward the product, and second, through the changes in the product function 
judgment. These underlying processes differentiate emotion regulation from other 
self-regulatory behavior (e.g., thought suppression) with regard to the effect on 
consumer judgment and choice. 
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1.2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
Building upon recent psychology research in emotion regulation (Gross 1998; 
Ochsner et al. 2002; Phelps 2006; Richards and Gross 2000; Schmeichel, Vohs, and 
Baumeister 2003), the current research delineates a framework explaining the 
processes and consequences of regulating emotional reactions toward marketing 
stimuli. 
When consumers encounter products or advertisements, they may naturally 
have emotional reactions based on a quick appraisal of the physical appearance of the 
products or the emotional advertising appeals. In the event that they do not want to 
make emotion-based judgments, they may adopt a variety of emotion regulatory 
strategies to reduce their emotional reactions. As this research focuses on emotion 
regulation during the product evaluation process, the cognitive regulation of emotions 
is particularly applicable (cf., behavioral regulatory strategies such as avoiding 
evaluating the product). More specifically, two important strategies that are frequently 
adopted in everyday life (Gross, Richards, and John 2006) — the reappraisal strategy 
and the suppression strategy—are examined in this research. 
The reappraisal strategy refers to the interpretation of a stimulus from an 
emotionally detached perspective, which can be applied before emotions are actually 
elicited (e.g., before attention is given to the emotion-eliciting stimulus) to reduce the 
generation of emotional reactions (Gross 1998; Larsen and Prizmic 2004). The 
suppression strategy refers to the inhibition of ongoing emotional response tendencies 
(e.g., while attending to the emotion-eliciting stimulus), which can be applied during 
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the emotion generative process (Gross 1998; Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003). 
These two strategies are chosen for investigation based on two theoretical 
considerations. First, they represent regulatory strategies that can be applied at 
different stages of the emotion generative process—prior to emotion generation 
versus during emotion generation. Second, because of the process differences, they 
may require different levels of cognitive-resource input. Reappraisal alters the entire 
emotion generative process from the very beginning and hence requires minimal 
cognitive resources to monitor and adjust emotional reactions subsequently. In 
contrast, suppression is applied when consumers detect emotional response tendencies, 
the implementation of which requires consumers to engage in a loop of monitoring 
and inhibiting their emotions continually during the product evaluation process. Thus, 
suppression should consume greater cognitive resources than reappraisal (Gross 1998; 
Richards and Gross 2000) and may potentially entail consequences for consumer 
judgment.  
To understand the basis of how emotion regulation affects consumer judgment 
and choice, experiment 1 compares the cognitive-resource requirement for 
reappraising and suppressing feelings toward products. Findings from this experiment 
establish the premise that effective emotion suppression consumes appreciable 
cognitive resources whereas reappraisal does not.  
Because consumers have finite cognitive resources at any given time (Lynch 
and Srull 1982; Payne 1982), fewer resources would be left for processing product 
attribute information when emotion suppression consumes part of the resources. 
Based on this logic, subsequent experiments focus on the suppression strategy and 
examine the implications of its cognitive-resource requirement to consumer judgment 
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and choice. Specifically, experiments 2 and 3 show that contrary to the popular notion 
that managing emotions should result in accurate judgments that are based on 
objective product features, successful suppression of emotional reactions toward 
marketing stimuli may impair consumers’ capability to process product attribute 
information systematically. Experiments 4 and 5 further suggest that under conditions 
where product function information is difficult to process, consumers who suppress 
their feelings toward products, compared to those who do not, may be more inclined 
to make emotion-based choices (i.e., choose the alternative that is superior in affective 
dimension). Demonstrating these potential effects of the nonuse of feelings on product 
judgment and choice, the present research complements the previous research on the 
use of feelings in consumer judgment to provide a more complete theoretical account 
of the impact of feelings on consumer judgment. 
In the following chapters, previous research on emotion generation, emotion 
regulation, and product judgment is reviewed, upon which the conceptual framework 
of this research is developed. Next, three experiments examining the impact of 
emotion regulation on product judgment are presented. Thereafter, further hypotheses 
regarding emotion regulation and consumer choice are developed, followed by a 
report of two experiments examining the impact of emotion regulation on choice. 
Finally, implications of the present research and avenues for future research are 
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2 
EMOTION REGULATION AND  
CONSUMER JUDGMENT 
 
Firms frequently incorporate emotional features in the design of products and 
advertisements to enhance consumers’ liking for their products. For example, the 
design aesthetics of a product can be a strategic advantage to firms in the competitive 
marketplace (Kotler and Rath 1984). Prior research has demonstrated design 
aesthetics’ ability to evoke favorable emotional reactions (Bloch 1995; Bloch, Brunel, 
and Arnold 2003; Csikszentimihalyi and Robinson 1990), which may lead to brand 
preference (Veryzer 1993), buying impulse (Rook 1987), and final acquisition of the 
product (Bloch 1995). Another common emotion-evoking marketing stimulus is in 
emotional advertising appeal, which may influence product judgments by eliciting 
emotions among consumers. For example, positive emotional reactions toward an 
advertisement may be translated into liking for the advertisement, liking for the 
product being advertised, and purchase intention (Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986; 
Holbrook and Batra 1987). 
When consumers do not wish to rely on their emotions as a basis for decisions, 
they may apply a variety of strategies to deal with their emotional reactions toward 
marketing stimuli (Hoch and Loewenstein 1991; Kacen and Lee 2002). Consumers 
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may hold a lay theory that they can refrain from being influenced by their emotional 
reactions if they regulate and reduce these reactions through self-control. However, to 
what extent can this regulation be successful? Also, does a successful regulation of 
emotional reactions toward a product always lead to a rational judgment of the 
product? This research provides answers to these questions.  
Building on the consensual model of emotion regulation (Gross 1998; 
Richards and Gross 2000), this research examines two important emotion regulatory 
strategies that consumers may adopt—the reappraisal strategy which takes place 
before emotions are generated and the suppression strategy which is applied when 
emotions are already underway. These strategies and their respective emotion 
regulatory processes are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.1 EMOTION REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
 
Emotion regulation2 refers to the evocation of thoughts or behaviors that alter 
a naturally occurring emotion. People may apply emotion regulatory strategies at 
certain stages of the emotion generative process to influence the emotions being 
generated, experienced, or expressed (Gross 1998). To understand how different 
emotion regulatory strategies may alter emotional reactions toward a stimulus through 
different processes, a review of the relevant previous research on emotion is first 
                                                        
2
 Unlike emotion-focused coping which refers to thoughts or behaviors aimed at reducing negative 
emotions elicited by a problem so as to avoid facing the problem (Lazarus 1991), emotion 
regulation can be applied to both positive and negative emotions, and its purpose is to solve a 
problem or to accomplish a goal by controlling emotions rather than to avoid facing a problem 
(Thompson 1994).   
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provided in the next section. 
 
2.1.1 Emotion Categorization and Emotion Generation 
 
Earlier research on emotion focused on the categorization of emotional 
responses. Researchers attempted to provide a list of basic emotions such as joy, anger, 
fear, sadness, and disgust which may serve as the building blocks for higher levels of 
emotions (Izard 1977; also see Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Innes-Ker 1999 for a 
review). It is assumed that basic emotions are characterized by universal physiological 
reactions and facial expressions (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1982). Researchers 
also investigated the dimensional structure of emotional responses to differentiate 
various emotions with a more parsimonious set of defining characteristics. Two 
dimensions, intensity and valence, are often used to distinguish emotions. The 
intensity dimension refers to the level of arousal or how strongly individuals feel an 
emotion. The valence dimension refers to the pleasant (positive) or unpleasant 
(negative) nature of an emotion (Russell 1980). Research in this area advanced 
knowledge on the emotional responses individuals may have, but it did little to inform 
the process through which emotions are generated.  
More recent emotion research emphasized the process underlying the 
generation of emotions. Research suggests that emotions may be generated through 
different processes (Berkowitz 1993; Pham et al. 2001). First, sensory experiences 
such as pain or bad taste may elicit emotional reactions through an automatic 
associative process (Berkowitz 1993; Lazarus 1982; Leventhal 1984). Second, certain 
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stimulus such as a Christmas song might trigger emotional reactions through 
conditioning or pattern matching (Allen and Madden 1985; Gorn 1982). These two 
processes are relatively automatic and require little cognition. The third way of 
emotion generation, appraisal, is more complicated with varying levels of 
consciousness and deliberation. As this process is particularly relevant to the 
generation of emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli as well as it being 
involved in an important emotion regulatory strategy (namely reappraisal), it is 
discussed in more detail presently. 
Appraisal theory suggests that individuals’ emotional reactions are based on 
their appraisal of a situation or a target (Lazarus 1991; Schwarz and Clore 1996). The 
generation of emotion requires cognition, which involves an interpretation of the 
innovativeness, significance, relevance, and consequence of the target. Some 
researchers regard appraisal as an antecedent to emotion while others regard appraisal 
as a component of emotion (see Ellsworth and Scherer 2003 for a review). The former 
confines emotion to emotional responses whereas the latter conceives emotion to 
encompass the entire emotion generative process. Nevertheless, both suggest that the 
generation of emotional reactions may vary with the way people interpret the target. 
In other words, the generation of emotional reactions is relational and flexible. There 
are no absolute features of a target that will lead to a certain emotional reaction. The 
emotional reaction toward a target depends on the perspective with which people 
assess and construe the target.  
Moreover, there are potentially different perspectives to adopt for appraising a 
given target. Under different conditions, people may appraise and interpret the same 
target differently and hence experience different emotions (Lazarus 1991). For 
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example, Tomaka and colleagues (1997) examined students’ stress responses to an 
arithmetic test. Participants assigned to the threat appraisal condition were told that 
they should complete the test as quickly and accurately as possible and that they 
would get scored for speed and accuracy, a procedure that induced them to construe 
the test as a threat to their ability. Participants assigned to the challenge appraisal 
condition were instructed to think of the task as a challenge and think of themselves 
as someone capable of meeting that challenge. The results indicated that the 
manipulation of cognitive appraisal influenced the way participants appraised the test 
and the corresponding emotional reactions. Participants in the threat appraisal 
condition felt more stressed than those in the challenge appraisal condition. 
An emerging body of research in neuroscience provides neurophysiological 
evidence that the appraisal of a stimulus can influence the generation of emotional 
reactions. Researchers observed the activation of amygdala, a brain structure which is 
primarily associated with emotional reactions and is also extensively connected with 
brain structures for cognitive functioning (Phelps et al. 2001). They found that the 
cognitive interpretation and mental representation of the emotional properties of a 
stimulus would influence amygdala activation and the corresponding emotional 
reactions (Phelps et al. 2001; Schaefer et al. 2002; Wheeler and Fiske 2004).  
In the context of this research where consumers encounter a product or an 
advertisement, a spontaneous appraisal of product appearance or pictorial advertising 
design is likely to take place which elicits emotional reactions (e.g., Hirschman 1986; 
Yeung and Wyer 2004). Moreover, the aesthetics of a product or the design of an 
advertisement itself does not always lead to the same emotional reaction under 
various situations. The emotional reactions consumers have depend on their way of 
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appraisal. Thus, consumers may be able to reduce their emotional reactions toward 
marketing stimuli through a particular way of appraisal that decreases the emotional 
relevance of the marketing stimuli. This emotion regulatory strategy, reappraisal, is 




As a particular way of appraising a stimulus, the reappraisal strategy refers to 
the interpretation of a stimulus from a neutral and detached perspective which 
decreases the emotional relevance of the stimulus (Gross 1998; Richards and Gross 
2000; Ochsner et al. 2002). Using the reappraisal strategy, individuals can reduce their 
emotional reactions toward a stimulus that tends to evoke emotional reactions. For 
example, individuals who see a badly injured person typically experience a strong, 
negative emotion, but Richards and Gross (2000) found that participants who received 
the instruction to view the pictures of badly injured person from a doctor’s perspective 
reported experiencing low emotional reactions toward the pictures. The finding 
suggests that if individuals adopt a reappraisal strategy and appraise a stimulus in 
more analytical and indifferent terms, they may be able to detach themselves from the 
emotional aspect of the stimulus and feel relatively neutral.  
Recent advancements in neuroscience also provide neurophysiological 
evidence (e.g., amygdala activation) that people can reduce the generation of 
emotional reactions toward a stimulus through reappraisal (Ochsner et al. 2002; 
Phelps 2006). For example, Ochsner and colleagues (2002) examined participants’ 
   - 14 - 
neural responses to pictures of emotional scenes such as a woman crying out of a 
church. Participants either responded naturally to the scene (e.g., interpreting the 
scene as a woman who has attended a funeral and cried in grief) or were instructed to 
reappraise the scene to reduce its emotional significance (e.g., interpreting the scene 
as a woman attending a wedding crying in joy). Results indicated that reappraisal 
reduced amygdala activation which is primarily associated with emotional reactions.  
Although previous studies have focused on the reappraisal of stimuli that are 
likely to evoke negative emotions, the process of reappraisal should be generalizable 
to stimuli that are likely to elicit positive emotions. In a consumer context, high-
aesthetic products or emotional advertising appeals are potentially able to evoke 
positive feelings among consumers. However, through a conscious emotion regulatory 
strategy such as reappraisal, consumers may choose a particular perspective for 
interpreting marketing stimuli to manage their emotional reactions. If consumers who 
see an aesthetically attractive product reappraise the product in an emotionally 
detached manner, they should experience a low level of positive feelings toward the 
product as a consequence. 
To summarize, consumers can adopt the reappraisal strategy to reduce the 
generation of emotional reactions in anticipation of potentially emotion-evoking 
marketing stimuli. Although this strategy is effective for changing the entire emotion 
trajectory, it may not be readily adoptable to consumers at all times. This is because 
reappraisal requires consumers to adopt a different interpretation of potentially 
enticing marketing stimuli before they encounter the stimuli. If consumers have no 
experience in putting themselves in an emotionally detached mindset, they may not be 
able to do so effectively on the spot. As such, consumers may need some practice 
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before they can apply this strategy appropriately when the situation calls for it (Gross 
2002; Phelps 2006). In contrast, suppression, another regulatory strategy, may be 
applied more readily when consumers have already started experiencing emotional 




The suppression strategy refers to the inhibition of ongoing emotional 
response tendencies during the emotion generative process, which can be applied to 
inner experiences as well as overt behaviors such as facial expressions (Gross 1998; 
Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003). For example, one may suppress one’s 
positive feelings toward a beautiful but expensive product; one may keep a poker face 
at an enticing product to obtain a better position in bargaining with the salesperson.  
Previous research on the suppression strategy has focused primarily on the 
suppression of facial expression as a form of suppression behavior (Larsen and 
Prizmic 2004; Ochsner et al. 2002; Richards and Gross 2000). For example, Richards 
and Gross (2000) showed participants movies and slides that may potentially evoke 
negative emotions and instructed participants not to show any emotions on their faces. 
Results indicated that when participants kept negative emotions from showing, their 
memory for the detail of the emotion-eliciting stimuli was impaired. The impaired 
memory is attributed to the process underlying expressive suppression which requires 
people to continually monitor and inhibit their facial expressions while being exposed 
to the emotion-eliciting stimuli.  
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Although most previous research has examined expressive suppression 
involving negative emotions, the process underlying expressive suppression may 
apply to other kinds of suppression behaviors as well as the suppression involving 
positive emotions. Initial empirical evidence can be found in Schmeichel, Vohs, and 
Baumeister (2003) where participants followed explicit instruction to suppress both 
their internal emotional experiences and external facial expressions elicited by an 
emotionally upsetting video clip. 
When consumers suppress their emotional reactions that are elicited by 
product aesthetics, a similar emotion regulatory process is likely to occur. To achieve 
suppression, consumers need to engage in a loop of monitoring their current 
emotional reactions (e.g., do I have any feelings toward the appearance of the 
product?), comparing their emotional reactions with their desired state (e.g., no 
feelings), and trying to move close to their desired state (e.g., I should work to inhibit 
my feelings if I detect any response tendency). This process requires consumers to 
manage their emotional responses effortfully as these responses continually arise 
during the product evaluation process.  
To summarize, consumers can adopt the suppression strategy to inhibit their 
emotional reactions in the event that they experience emotional response tendencies 
toward marketing stimuli which they do not wish to rely on. Although the 
implementation of suppression does not require consumers to change their mindset at 
the very beginning as reappraisal does, it entails an effortful self-monitoring and 
adjusting process. 
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2.1.4 Resource Requirement of Reappraisal and Suppression 
 
Comparing between the reappraisal and the suppression strategies, reappraisal 
primarily attempts to curtail the generation of emotions at the early stage of the 
emotion generative process (Gross 1998; Richards and Gross 2000). As it takes place 
prior to the generation of emotional responses, it can efficiently change the entire 
subsequent emotion trajectory, and there is less of a need for consumers to monitor 
and regulate their emotional reactions constantly while being exposed to enticing 
marketing stimuli. Consequently, it places a low demand on cognitive resources for 
exerting effective control over one’s emotional response. In contrast, the suppression 
strategy is applied after an emotional response tendency is detected (Gross 1998; 
Richards and Gross 2000). It requires consumers to continually monitor and adjust 
their emotional reactions during the entire product evaluation process, which may 
consume a relatively higher level of cognitive resources3.  
The proposed distinction between reappraising and suppressing emotional 
reactions is also consistent with existing physiological evidence. Suppression was 
found to result in greater sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system than 
reappraisal (Gross 2002).  
Therefore, while the successful suppression of emotional reactions toward 
marketing stimuli is more dependent on the availability of cognitive resources, 
                                                        
3
 Note that consumers may suppress their emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli with 
different tactics, such as engaging in attentional control (e.g., constantly ignoring the emotional 
properties of the stimuli) or thought control (e.g., constantly refraining from elaborating on the 
emotional properties of the stimuli). Nevertheless, these suppression tactics all involve a constant 
self-monitoring and adjusting process that consumes cognitive resources.  
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effective reappraisal should be less sensitive to resource availability. 
 
The above conceptualization leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
H1: Consumers adopting the suppression strategy would reduce their 
emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli effectively when they have 
high cognitive resources but not when they have low cognitive resources. 
In contrast, consumers adopting the reappraisal strategy would reduce 
their emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli effectively regardless 
of the availability of cognitive resources.  
 
This hypothesis may not seem to bear direct relevance to consumer judgment. 
However, since this research is the first empirical study in a marketing context to 
examine the regulation of positive, product-elicited emotions, it is necessary to first 
validate the cognitive-resource requirement associated with different regulatory 
strategies before moving on to examine the cognitive impact of emotion regulation. 
Obtaining support for this hypothesis would establish the premise that different forms 
of emotion regulation consume different levels of cognitive resources.  
Experiment 1 was set up to show that the effectiveness of regulating emotional 
reactions toward marketing stimuli (operationalized as product aesthetics in the 
experiment) depends on the availability of cognitive resources and the regulatory 
strategy used. It is expected that the successful application of the suppression strategy 
is more dependent on the availability of cognitive resources than reappraisal. As a 
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direct test of the resource allocation hypothesis, experiment 1 adopted a dual task 
methodology with a direct process manipulation of the availability of cognitive 
resources. Specifically, participants performed a second task concurrently with the 
regulation of emotions. Because a portion of the cognitive resources were occupied by 
this second task, participants should have fewer resources left for emotion regulation. 
Therefore, they would be less successful in suppressing their emotional reactions 
toward product aesthetics due to the resource prerequisite of the suppression strategy. 
 
2.2 The Impact of Emotion Suppression on Consumer Judgment 
 
As discussed previously, unlike reappraisal, suppression consumes appreciable 
cognitive resources. This makes suppression more likely to lead to an impairment of 
cognitive functioning which affects consumer judgment. In this section, I discuss the 
suppression strategy and its impact on consumer judgment. 
 
2.2.1 Emotion Suppression, Resource Consumption, and Central Executive 
Functioning 
 
An implication arising from the resource requirement of emotion suppression 
is that such a regulatory strategy may compete with other mental processes for the 
same pool of resources. Moreover, the cognitive resources consumed by emotion 
suppression include not only resources for monitoring internal feelings but also 
resources for guiding and controlling one’s feelings, which are associated with central 
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executive functioning (Baddeley 1986, 1996).  
The central executive function is critical in Baddeley’s (1986, 1996) working 
memory model. Baddeley suggested that human working memory consists of three 
components—central executive, phonological loop, and visuo-spatial sketchpad. The 
operation of the latter two systems is controlled and coordinated by the central 
executive—the higher-order cognitive operations that are involved in the planning, 
execution, and regulation of behavior.  
The central executive function may be affected by emotion suppression. This 
is because individuals only have a finite pool of cognitive resources at any given time, 
and the resources, especially the part required for central executive functioning, 
cannot be fully refilled immediately after usage (Baumeister 2002; Richeson and 
Trawalter 2005; Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003; Vohs, Baumeister, and 
Ciarocco 2005). Thus, one kind of self-regulatory behavior may impair people’s 
performance on the other self-regulatory behaviors that occur simultaneously or 
subsequently. For example, research found that behaviors involving monitoring and 
controlling responses, doing logical reasoning tests, inhibiting impulsive buying, and 
managing impression may consume a common pool of resources for self control, and 
that spending resources on one of these behaviors may have an impact on the other 
behaviors that also require the resources (Baumeister 2002; Baumeister and 
Heatherton 1996; Carver and Scheier 1981; Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003; 
Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005). Therefore, when consumers suppress their 
emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli, the suppression process may consume 
resources that could otherwise be used for central executive functioning. As central 
executive functioning is essential for coordinating performance on complex tasks 
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(Baddeley 1986, 1996), it is of theoretical relevance to consumers’ processing of 
product attribute information. 
 
2.2.2 Central Executive Functioning, Product Information Processing, and 
Consumer Judgment 
 
Many products are characterized by a list of product attributes. To make 
product judgments based on the list of product attributes, consumers need to 
comprehend, analyze, compare, and integrate the attribute information. This process 
may involve the activation of previously acquired product knowledge into the 
working memory, evaluating the product attributes with reference to a preference 
structure, comparing this product with other competing products, and integrating the 
information to form overall product judgments.  
Given these cognitive operations that are needed for reaching a product 
judgment, it seems appropriate to suggest that such systematic processing of product 
attribute information requires executive cognitive processes. As executive cognitive 
processes require resources for guiding and controlling responses (Richeson and 
Trawalter 2005; Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003), the systematic processing 
of product information may thus be sensitive to the availability of cognitive resources. 
To the extent that emotion suppression consumes appreciable cognitive resources that 
would be needed for central executive functioning, emotion suppression may 
consume the resources that could otherwise be used for comprehending, comparing, 
and integrating attribute information that is relevant to the judgment of a product.  
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Based on this reasoning, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H2: Consumers who suppress their emotional reactions toward marketing 
stimuli, as compared to those who do not, would be less capable of 
processing product attribute information systematically. 
 
This hypothesis might appear counterintuitive as consumers who suppress 
their emotions may focus on product attribute information pertaining to product 
functions (as they cannot using their emotions as informational inputs for product 
judgments) and thus expect to make better judgments based on the systematic 
processing of function information. However, this research argues to the contrary that, 
consumers’ capability to process the information would be impaired, which 
consequently may have a detrimental effect on product judgments.  
Experiments 2 and 3 were set up to demonstrate the impact of emotion 
suppression on consumer judgment. Experiment 2 manipulated emotion suppression 
with experimental instructions whereas experiment 3 induced emotion suppression 
with a subtler priming procedure. 
To examine whether participants can process product attribute information 
systematically, a method established in the literature was employed (e.g., Chaiken 
1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). Specifically, 
the strength of the product arguments presented to participants was manipulated, with 
one condition showing strong arguments and the other showing weak arguments. 
Participants with unimpaired cognitive functioning should be able to comprehend the 
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arguments, decide whether these arguments were relevant to the product judgment, 
and form the judgment by analyzing the cogency of the arguments. As such, among 
these participants, those who saw the strong arguments should judge the product more 
favorably than those who saw the weak arguments. On the other hand, participants 
with impaired cognitive functioning resulting from suppressing their emotion may be 
less capable of processing the cogency of the product arguments. Consequently, their 
product judgment might be less affected by argument strength. To summarize, if 
argument strength had an effect on product judgment, it would indicate that 
participants were capable of processing the product attribute information 
systematically. However, if argument strength had no effect on product judgment, it 
would indicate that participants failed to process the product attribute information 
systematically. 
In the following chapter, experiments 1 to 3 are reported. Experiment 1 
examined the premise that suppression consumes more cognitive resources than 
reappraisal. Experiments 2 and 3 then proceeded to examine the impact of 
suppression on consumers’ processing of product attribute information and the 
corresponding product judgment. Thereafter, further hypotheses regarding emotion 
suppression on consumer choice will be developed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENTS: PART I 
 




The purpose of experiment 1 was twofold. First, the existing findings on the 
cognitive cost of expressive suppression (i.e., suppression of facial expressions) were 
generalized to emotion suppression (i.e., suppression of positive emotional reactions 
that are elicited by a product). The generalization is important in marketing in light of 
the fact that consumers are more often confronted by decisions that require their 
suppression of feelings rather than merely their control of facial expressions. The 
second objective was to establish the premise that the effectiveness of regulating 
emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli (e.g., product aesthetics) depends on the 
availability of cognitive resources and the regulatory strategy used. To do so, the level 
of cognitive resources available for the emotion regulation task was manipulated and 
the extent to which participants could successfully regulate their emotions was 
measured. Participants who adopted the suppression strategy were expected to be able 
to reduce their emotional reactions toward product aesthetics effectively when they 
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had high cognitive resources but not when they had low cognitive resources. In 
contrast, participants who adopted the reappraisal strategy were expected to be able to 
reduce their emotional reactions toward product aesthetics effectively regardless of 
the level of cognitive resources available.  
This experiment had a 5 (regulatory strategy: suppression vs. two forms of 
reappraisal vs. two forms of non-regulation) x 2 (cognitive resources: low vs. high) x 
2 (product aesthetics: low vs. high) mixed-factorial design. Product aesthetics was 
manipulated within-subject. Reappraisal was manipulated in two ways to provide 
converging evidence to the hypothesis. Accordingly, the non-regulation control 
condition was manipulated in two different ways to make the procedure comparable 
to the two reappraisal conditions. One hundred and sixty-five undergraduate students 
participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit.  
 
3.1.2 Stimuli Development 
 
Two different designs of clock representing high-aesthetic product (tend to 
evoke a higher level of emotional reactions) and low-aesthetic product (tend to evoke 
a lower level emotional reactions) respectively were selected as stimuli for this 
experiment. The product category was deemed appropriate for this experiment 
because clocks in the marketplace vary greatly in terms of product aesthetics and thus 
can be used to elicit varying levels of emotional reactions. The pictures of the two 
clocks were presented in figure 3.1.  
The two clocks were carefully selected from a pretest to ensure that they 
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elicited the intended level of emotional reactions among participants. Thirty 
undergraduate students who were from the same population as participants in the 
main experiment took part in the pretest. Their rating of the extent to which they felt 
pleased, delighted, amused, and joyful when seeing each clock (1 = not at all to 5 = 
very much; adapted from Holbrook and Batra 1987; Richins 1997) were averaged to 
form an index of emotional reaction (Cronbach’s α = .86 and .81 for the high-aesthetic 
and low-aesthetic design respectively). Results showed that the relatively high-
aesthetic design elicited significantly higher positive emotional reactions than the 



















3.1.3.1 Manipulation of Regulatory Strategy 
 
Instructions for Reappraisal. Reappraisal was manipulated in two different 
ways—participants either received explicit instruction regarding the way to appraise a 
product, or underwent a priming procedure which induced them to be in an 
emotionally detached mindset. The explicit instruction was adapted from Richards 
and Gross (2000) and read as follows: “…adopt a neutral attitude as you see the 
clocks. To do this, please view the clocks from an emotionally detached perspective. 
In other words, as you see the clocks, try to think about them objectively, analytically 
and technically rather than in any way emotionally relevant to you.”  
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The primed reappraisal was conducted under the cover story of a study on 
choice experience prior to the presumably unrelated product evaluation study. 
Participants were asked to write about an instance where they were going to purchase 
a particular product among several choice options, and where they evaluated the 
different options from a pragmatic, technical, and analytical perspective even though 
the options may have some hedonic features. They were also instructed to try to 
remember as clearly as possible what happened, and to recount the evaluation process 
before penning down their recollection. This procedure was adapted from previous 
studies which showed that cognitive procedures may be primed to influence the 
subsequent processing of information (e.g., Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004). 
 
Instructions for Emotion Suppression. Suppression was manipulated by asking 
participants “…try not to feel any emotions as you see the clocks. In other words, 
when you see the clocks, try to suppress your emotional reactions (if any) toward the 
clocks so that you have no feelings about the clocks and the other people cannot see 
any expressions on your face” (adapted from Richards and Gross 2000; Schmeichel, 
Vohs, and Baumeister 2003; Wegner, Erber, and Zanakos 1993).  
 
Instructions for Non-Regulation. There were two non-regulation conditions to 
serve as control conditions where participants responded to the clocks with little 
emotion regulation. In one condition, participants were asked to respond to the 
products naturally. In the other condition, participants were asked to write about a 
product choice experience prior to the product evaluation study. This condition 
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(named primed non-regulation hereafter) served as a comparable counterpart to the 
primed reappraisal condition.  
 
3.1.3.2 Manipulation of Cognitive Resource 
 
The procedure used to manipulate participants’ cognitive resources was similar 
to that employed in Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999). Specifically, the manipulation was 
administered under the guise of a separate study from the university hospital for 
understanding how people’s academic background shapes their memorizing ability. 
Participants were asked to memorize either a two-digit number (high cognitive 
resources condition) or a seven-digit number (low cognitive resources condition) and 
recall it at the end of the experiment. Participants who memorized a seven-digit 
number should have a lower level of cognitive resources left for regulating their 
emotions than those who memorized a two-digit number. The numbers used in the 
experiment were generated randomly. 
 
3.1.4 Procedure and Measures 
 
In the primed reappraisal and the primed non-regulation conditions, 
participants first completed a study on choice experience where they were instructed 
to think and write about their respective choice experiences. They then proceeded to 
the product evaluation study. In all the other conditions where regulatory strategy was 
manipulated, participants started with the product evaluation study. They were told 
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that the objective of this study was to examine consumers’ responses toward product 
designs under various situations. The respective instruction for emotion regulation 
(for the explicit reappraisal, suppression, or non-regulation condition) was given as 
part of the introduction to the product evaluation study. After participants read the 
introduction, the cognitive-resource manipulation was administered where 
participants were required to memorize a number and recall it at the end of the 
experiment session. The manipulation of cognitive resources was given after the 
emotion regulation instructions had been presented to ensure participants had 
sufficient cognitive resources to comprehend the instruction for the emotion 
regulation manipulation. After memorizing the number, participants were asked to 
read the introduction to the product evaluation study again. Thereafter, they saw a 
picture of a clock for 10 seconds (as determined by a pretest to be sufficient for 
evaluating the clock without causing boredom). Thereafter, they were asked to 
indicate their responses to the clock along five-point scales—the extent to which they 
felt pleased, delighted, amused, and joyful when they saw the clock (1 = not at all to 5 
= very much). Next, they repeated the same procedure (i.e., saw a product picture and 
indicated emotional reactions) for the second clock. The order in which the two clocks 
were presented was counterbalanced.  
Thereafter, participants answered the manipulation-check question—“I 
worked at controlling my emotions when viewing the clock” (1 = not at all to 5 = very 
much), as well as the familiarity check question on whether they had seen the clocks 
before. Finally, their mood was measured using the PANAS scale (Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen 1988). The items include how interested, distressed, excited, upset, strong, 
guilty, scared, hostile, enthusiastic, proud, irritable, alert, ashamed, inspired, nervous, 
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determined attentive, jittery, active, and afraid they were feeling at the moment. These 
scales range from one (very slightly or not at all) to five (extremely). The average of 
each participant’s responses to the 10 positive affect items was subtracted from the 
average of his or her responses to the 10 negative affect items to form an overall index 
of the positive mood the participant was experiencing. This measure served to check 
the possible confounding effect of negative mood (e.g., fatigue, boredom) due to the 
procedure of emotion-regulation or cognitive-resource manipulation, which might 





3.1.5.1 Manipulation and Confounding Checks 
 
Data from two participants were not used because of their failure to recall the 
seven-digit number, resulting in a sample size of 163. An ANOVA with regulatory 
strategy and cognitive resources as predictors was conducted on the manipulation 
check question (“I worked at controlling my emotions when viewing the clock”). 
Only the main effect of regulatory strategy was significant (F(4, 153) = 17.16, p 
< .05). Participants adopting the suppression strategy indicated exerting a greater 
effort at controlling their emotions (Msuppression = 3.44) than those adopting the 
reappraisal strategy and those who did not regulate their emotions (Mexplicit-reappraisal = 
2.62, Mprimed-reappraisal = 2.26, Mnon-regulation = 1.90, and Mprimed-non-regulation = 1.82; p-
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values < .05, bonferroni post-hoc tests)4.  
An ANOVA with regulatory strategy and cognitive resources as predictors of 
mood revealed no significant effects (cell means range from .57 to .85; F-values < 1, 
NS), discounting a mood-related explanation for the findings.  
In addition, regarding the familiarity check question, none of the participants 
indicated they had seen the clocks before. 
 
3.1.5.2 Emotional Reaction 
 
An index of positive emotional reaction was created by averaging the four 
items measuring emotions (pleased, delighted, amused, and joyful; Cronbach’s α = .83 
for the high-aesthetic design and .81 for the low-aesthetic design). An ANOVA 
involving regulatory strategy and cognitive resources as between-subjects factors and 
the emotion indices for the two clock designs treated as a repeated measure revealed a 
significant three-way interaction effect (F(4, 153) = 2.86, p < .05)5. The results are 
graphically presented in figure 3.2. 
Follow-up contrasts for the high-aesthetic design showed that the two-way 
interaction between regulatory strategy and cognitive resources was significant (F(4, 
                                                        
4
 Although participants who received explicit instruction to reappraise the product also indicated 
exerting a greater effort at controlling their emotions than those in the non-regulation (p = .07) and 
those in the primed non-regulation conditions (p < .05), this is considered less of a problem given 
that (a) the effort at controlling emotions associated with explicit-reappraisal was significantly less 
than that associated with suppression (p < .05), and (b) there were no differences between the 
subtler primed-reappraisal condition and the non-regulation conditions. 
5
 The effect of presentation order of the two pictures was not significant and would not be 
discussed further. 
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153) = 2.66, p < .05). First, consider participants who adopted a suppression strategy. 
It was expected that emotion suppression would consume cognitive resources and 
therefore, participants who had higher cognitive resources should be more successful 
in suppressing their emotions.  Consistent with this prediction, the findings showed 
that participants with high cognitive resources experienced a lower level of positive 
emotions toward high-aesthetic design than those with low cognitive resources (Mhigh-
resource = 2.09 vs. Mlow-resource = 2.96; F(1, 153) = 13.35, p < .05). Next, consider 
participants who adopted a reappraisal strategy. Because reappraisal incurs little 
cognitive cost, participants should be equally successful in reducing their emotional 
reactions regardless of the availability of cognitive resources. The findings were 
consistent with this expectation (reappraisal-explicit: Mhigh-resource = 2.25 and Mlow-
resource = 2.15; F < 1, NS; reappraisal-primed: Mhigh-resource = 2.07 and Mlow-resource = 2.00; 
F < 1, NS) 6.  
Further analyses were performed to compare the different regulatory strategies 
with the non-regulation baselines. Under low cognitive-resource conditions, 
                                                        
6
 To provide complete information on each condition, none of the conditions were collapsed in the 
analyses presented above. Because there were no significant differences between the explicit 
reappraisal and the primed reappraisal conditions (with regard to the main effects of reappraisal 
type and cognitive resources as well as the interaction effect), nor were there differences between 
the two non-regulation conditions, additional analyses were conducted with the explicit and 
primed reappraisal conditions pooled as the reappraisal condition and the two non-regulation 
conditions pooled as the non-regulation condition. As predicted, An ANOVA with regulation 
strategy and cognitive resources as predictors of emotional reaction toward the high-aesthetic 
product revealed a significant interaction effect (F(2, 157) = 5.40, p < .05). Participants with high 
cognitive resources were more likely to suppress their emotions successfully than their 
counterparts with low cognitive resources (Mhigh-resource = 2.09 vs. Mlow-resource = 2.96; F(1, 157) = 
13.64, p < .05). In contrast, participants who reappraised the product from an emotionally 
detached perspective lowered their emotional reactions toward the high-aesthetic product, 
regardless of the level of cognitive resources they had (Mhigh-resource = 2.15 and Mlow-resource = 2.07; 
F < 1, NS).  
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participants who adopted a reappraisal strategy were successful in regulating their 
emotions—they experienced a lower level of positive emotional reactions toward the 
high-aesthetic design than those who did not regulate their emotions, and this was the 
case regardless of whether they were explicitly told to reappraise (Mexplicit-reappraisal = 
2.15 vs. Mnon-regulation = 3.39; F(1, 153) = 26.07, p < .05) or primed to reappraise 
(Mprimed-reappraisal = 2.00 vs. Mprimed-non-regulation = 3.34; F(1, 153) = 34.69; p < .05)7.  
In contrast, participants who adopted a suppression strategy did not appear to 
be successful in reducing their emotional reactions toward the high-aesthetic design. 
They experienced a similar level of positive emotions as those who did not regulate 
their emotions (Msuppression = 2.96 and Mnon-regulation = 3.39, NS; Msuppression = 2.96 and 
Mprimed-non-regulation = 3.34, NS)8.  
When participants had high cognitive resources, they could successfully 
reduce their emotions regardless of the regulatory strategy they adopted. These 
participants experienced a lower level of positive emotions than those who did not 
regulate their emotions (Mexplicit-reappraisal = 2.25 vs. Mnon-regulation = 3.33, F(1, 153) = 
21.00; Mprimed-reappraisal = 2.07 vs. Mprimed-non-regulation = 3.38, F(1, 153) = 32.76; 
Msuppression = 2.09 vs. Mnon-regulation = 3.33, F(1, 153) = 35.72; Msuppression = 2.09 vs. 
Mprimed-non-regulation = 3.38, F(1, 153) = 35.53; all p-values < .05)9.  
Regarding the base-line low-aesthetic design, neither the main effects of 
                                                        
7
 Additional analysis with the explicit and primed reappraisal conditions pooled as the reappraisal 
condition and the two non-regulation conditions pooled as the non-regulation condition revealed a 
similar pattern (Mreappraisal = 2.07 vs. Mnon-regulation = 3.37; F(1, 153) = 39.57, p < .05). 
8
 Additional analysis with the two non-regulation conditions pooled as the non-regulation 
condition revealed a similar pattern (Msuppression = 2.96 and Mnon-regulation = 3.37; NS).  
9
 Additional analysis with the explicit and primed reappraisal conditions pooled as the reappraisal 
condition and the two non-regulation conditions pooled as the non-regulation condition revealed a 
similar pattern (Mreappraisal = 2.15 vs. Mnon-regulation = 3.35, F(1, 153) = 34.95; Msuppression = 2.09 vs. 
Mnon-regulation = 3.35, F(1, 153) = 32.56,; both p-values < .05). 
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regulatory strategy and cognitive resources nor the interaction between them were 
significant in explaining the emotional reaction toward the design (F-values < 1, NS). 
This was expected as the intended emotional reactions were low in the first place. 
 
FIGURE 3.2 
EMOTIONAL REACTION TOWARD PRODUCT DESIGN— EXPERIMENT 1 
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3.2b Emotional Reaction toward Low-Aesthetic Design
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3.1.6 Discussion 
 
This experiment represents the first attempt in marketing to examine the 
regulation of product-elicited emotional reaction, its emotional consequence, and the 
cognitive-resource boundary underlying the different regulatory strategies. 
Participants performed a cognitive task (memorizing a number) when they attempted 
to regulate their emotional reactions toward product aesthetics. As this cognitive task 
and the emotion regulatory behavior competed for the same pool of cognitive 
resources, participants who were assigned the more demanding cognitive task had 
fewer cognitive resources left for regulating their emotional reactions than those who 
were assigned the less demanding cognitive task. The effectiveness of the emotion 
regulatory behavior, therefore, reflected the cognitive-resource requirement of a 
particular emotion regulatory strategy. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the findings 
suggest that when consumers adopt a suppression strategy, they would reduce their 
positive emotional reactions toward products effectively only under conditions where 
there are sufficient cognitive resources for them to engage in the process of 
monitoring and inhibiting their emotional response tendencies. In contrast, no such 
limitation is present for the reappraisal strategy.  
Due to its requisite cognitive inputs, emotion suppression should be more 
likely to impair consumers’ cognitive functioning than reappraisal. The next two 
experiments therefore focused on the suppression strategy and examined its impact on 
the processing of product attribute information and product judgment.  
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The purpose of experiment 2 was to test hypothesis 2, which predicted that 
consumers who suppress their emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli would be 
less capable of processing product attribute information systematically than those who 
do not suppress. This experiment had a 2 (regulatory strategy: suppression vs. non-
suppression) x 2 (argument strength: strong vs. weak) between-subjects design. One 
hundred and seventeen undergraduate students participated in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit.  
The potentially emotion-evoking marketing stimulus was operationalized as an 
emotional advertising appeal in this experiment. The purpose was twofold. First, it 
provided some degree of generality over marketing stimuli that possess emotional 
features (from product aesthetics to emotional advertising appeal). Second, 
advertising may elicit more intense emotional reactions than product aesthetics, which 
enabled an investigation of the suppression of emotions with varied intensity. 
Specifically, participants saw an advertisement that had both an emotional 
component and an informational component. The emotional component was capable 
of eliciting participants’ emotional reactions and the informational component 
consisted of arguments concerning the product’s functional attributes. If participants 
can process the product arguments systematically, those who saw the strong 
arguments should judge the products more favorably than those who saw the weak 
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arguments. On the other hand, if participants were less capable of processing product 
arguments systematically because of impaired cognitive functioning resulting from 
their emotion suppression, their product judgment may not be a function of argument 
strength. 
 
3.2.2 Stimuli Development 
 
A fictitious digital camera advertisement was created for this experiment. The 
emotional component of the advertisement was designed to elicit positive emotional 
reactions. It comprised four color photos ordered chronologically, matched with 
narratives to tell a story about the happy time a little boy shared with his grandma (see 
figure 3.3). This stimulus was shown to 28 student participants who then indicated the 
extent to which they felt joyful, happy, delighted, pleased, sad, depressed, sorrowful, 
and downhearted from seeing the emotional advertising appeal (1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much; adapted from Edell and Burke 1987; Holbrook and Batra 1987; Richins 
1997). An index of positive emotions was formed by averaging each participant’s 
responses to the four items pertaining to positive emotions (joyful, happy, delighted 
and pleased; Cronbach’s α = .91), and an index of negative emotions was formed by 
averaging each participant’s responses to the four items pertaining to negative 
emotions (sad, depressed, sorrowful, and downhearted; Cronbach’s α = .95). As 
expected, the emotional advertising appeal elicited predominantly positive feelings 
(Mpositive = 4.41 vs. Mnegative = 1.45; F(1, 27) = 195.59, p < .05).  
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FIGURE 3.3 EMOTIONAL COMPONENT OF THE ADVERTISEMENT—
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The informational component had either four strong or four weak product 
arguments with regard to the digital camera’s capability to produce high quality 
images (named as image quality capability hereafter). Evaluation of image quality 
capability was chosen as the main dependent variable because emotional reactions 
toward the advertisement should be irrelevant to the image quality capability of the 
digital camera. In other words, judgment concerning the camera’s capability to 
produce high quality images should only be based on the elaboration of the product 
arguments. Camera features selected from a pretest with 30 student participants were 
used to form two sets of product arguments. In the pretest, participants saw a list of 
camera features and indicated how convincing it was that the digital camera can 
produce high quality images given each of these features on a scale ranging from “not 
convincing at all” (0) to “very convincing” (7). The mean ratings of argument strength 
were presented in table 3.1. 
Based on the pretest, two sets of product arguments of comparable length were 
constructed to represent the respective argument strength condition. In the strong-
argument condition, the statements read “Capture the precious moments with AAA 
digital cameras. It is a great choice for consumers who want to shoot high quality 
digital photos. The 4-megapixel CCD sensor records high resolution images. The 3x 
optical zoom enables you to zoom in to distant objects. With an anti-shake system, it 
enables you to capture sharp images even when your hands are shaking. Moreover, it 
provides manual focus which allows more flexibility in addition to auto focus.” In the 
weak-argument condition, the statements read “Capture the precious moments with 
AAA digital cameras. It is a great choice for consumers who want to shoot high 
quality digital photos. The 3-megapixel CCD sensor records clear images. The large 
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memory space allows you to store hundreds of images. With an award-winning 
appearance design, it is a stylish piece of photography equipment. Moreover, it is 
compact in size which enables you to carry it easily in the pocket.” The weak 
arguments were generally positive features of a digital camera that were evaluated to 
contribute less to producing high-quality images.  
 
TABLE 3.1 
ARGUMENT STRENGTH WITH REFERENCE TO THE CAMERA’S 









Anti-shake system 5.96 
 
4-megapixel CCD sensor 5.74 
 
Manual focus 5.20 
 
3x optical zoom 4.79 
 
3-megapixel CCD sensor 4.25 
 
Award-winning appearance design 3.93 
 
Large memory space 3.87 
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3.2.3 Procedure and Measures 
 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the experiment was to assess 
consumer responses toward various designs of potential advertisements for a digital 
camera. Moreover, they were told that “Since the advertisements were still at a 
conceptual stage, the pictures employed were not indicative of the actual image 
resolution of the digital camera.” This instruction prevented participants from relying 
on the image quality of the advertising pictures to make product judgments. The 
manipulation of regulatory strategy was also given in the introduction to the study. 
Similar to experiment 1, participants in the suppression condition were asked to try 
their best not to feel any emotions as they viewed the advertisement, whereas 
participants in the non-suppression condition were asked to respond naturally. All 
participants then saw four advertising pictures (with narratives) one by one, each for 
15 seconds, followed by a fifth page containing the product arguments which they 
read for 30 seconds. The pictures and arguments were shown sequentially so that they 
did not compete in getting participants’ attention. Pretesting showed the time duration 
was adequate for participants to finish elaborating on all the information. 
Thereafter, participants indicated the image quality capability they thought the 
advertised digital camera had (0 = very low quality to 10 = very high quality) as well 
as how much they liked the advertised digital camera (0 = not at all to 10 = very 
much). Finally, for manipulation check, they responded to the statement “I worked at 
controlling my emotions when viewing the advertisement” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree). 
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3.2.4 Results 
 
3.2.4.1 Manipulation Check 
 
An ANOVA with regulatory strategy and argument strength as predictors of 
the manipulation check question showed that participants in the suppression condition 
indeed reported exerting a greater effort at controlling their emotions than those in the 
non-suppression condition (Msuppression = 4.53 vs. Mnon-suppression = 3.16; F(1, 113) = 
23.35, p < .05). This was applicable across both argument strength conditions, as 
evident from the non-significant interaction effect (F < 1, NS). 
 
3.2.4.2 Judgment of Image Quality Capability 
 
Recall that the product argument strength was judged with reference to the 
digital camera’s capability to produce high-quality images. Thus, to examine whether 
participants processed the product arguments presented in the advertisement 
systematically, the key dependent variable of interest is the camera’s capability to 
produce high quality images.  
Concerning the judgment of image quality capability, an ANOVA with 
regulatory strategy and argument strength as predictors revealed a significant two-way 
interaction (F(1, 113) = 3.94, p < .05). The results are summarized in figure 3.4a.  
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FIGURE 3.4 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
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As predicted, among participants who did not suppress their emotions, those 
who saw weak arguments judged the image quality capability to be lower than those 
who saw strong arguments (Mweak-argument = 5.93 vs. Mstrong-argument = 7.11; F(1, 113) = 
8.22, p < .05), indicating a significant effect of argument strength on product 
judgment. In contrast, participants who suppressed their emotions judged the image 
quality capability in a similar manner irrespective of the strength of the product 
arguments they saw (Mweak-argument = 6.90 and Mstrong-argument = 6.94; F < 1, NS).  
Additional comparisons were conducted within argument-strength conditions. 
The results showed that when the arguments were relatively weak, participants who 
suppressed their emotions judged the image quality capability of the digital camera to 
be higher than those who did not suppress their emotions (Msuppression = 6.90 vs. Mnon-
suppression = 5.93; F(1, 113) = 5.70, p < .05). In contrast, when the arguments were 
relatively strong, the judgment of image quality capability did not differ between 
participants who suppressed their emotions and those who did not (Msuppression = 6.94 
and Mnon-suppression = 7.11; F < 1, NS). 
 
3.2.4.3 Product Liking 
 
Participants’ liking for the digital camera was consistent with their judgment 
of image quality capability (see figure 3.4b). The two-way interaction of regulatory 
strategy with cognitive resources was significant (F(1, 113) = 4.54, p < .05). Among 
participants who suppressed their emotions, those who saw weak arguments liked the 
digital camera to the same extent as those who saw strong arguments (Mweak-argument = 
   - 46 - 
5.62 and Mstrong-argument = 5.71; F < 1, NS). In contrast, among participants who did not 
suppress their emotions, those who saw weak arguments liked the digital camera less 
than those who saw strong arguments (Mweak-argument = 4.10 vs. Mstrong-argument = 5.74; 
F(1, 113) = 9.89, p < .05).  
Additional comparisons within argument-strength conditions showed that 
when the arguments were relatively weak, participants who suppressed their emotions 
liked the digital camera more than those who did not suppress their emotions 
(Msuppression = 5.62 vs. Mnon-suppression = 4.10; F(1, 113) = 8.82, p < .05). In contrast, 
when the arguments were relatively strong, liking for the digital camera did not differ 
between participants who suppressed their emotions and those who did not (Msuppression 




One might expect consumers who suppress their feelings toward emotional 
advertising appeals to be more capable of differentiating argument strength because 
they may pay more attention to and rely more on the objective product information. 
However, the findings of this experiment support hypothesis 210 , suggesting that 
consumers are less capable of processing the product arguments systematically and 
                                                        
10
 A follow-up study was conducted where participants were instructed to suppress their emotional 
reactions after they had seen the first page of the emotional advertising appeal (i.e., after the initial 
emotional reactions were already elicited). Forty-two participants were randomly assigned to 
either the strong-argument or the weak-argument condition. The results provided converging 
evidence to hypothesis 2. Participants did not differ in their image quality capability judgment 
(Mweak-argument = 6.81 and Mstrong-argument = 6.71; F < 1; NS) or their liking for the camera (Mweak-
argument = 5.05 and Mstrong-argument = 4.81; F < 1; NS). 
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making accurate judgments when they suppress their emotional reactions toward 
emotional advertising appeals than when they do not. Furthermore, the incapability to 
differentiate argument strength seems to be mainly driven by a higher evaluation of 
the weak product arguments, a pattern which is consistent with previous study (Petty, 
Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). This may be attributed to the design of the 
arguments. These weak arguments were also positive features of the digital camera 
(e.g., nice appearance and large memory), but they were irrelevant to the image 
quality capability of the digital camera. In the condition that participants who 
suppressed their emotions were left with impaired cognitive capacity, they may have 
failed to reassess the relevance of the arguments and simply relied on a favorable 
impression of the camera when they were asked to evaluate its image quality 
capability.  
One alternative explanation for participants’ inability to discern argument 
strength is that those who were instructed to suppress their emotions may have paid 
more attention to the emotional component of the advertisement. However, 
participants’ attention was unlikely to be divided between the emotional component 
and the informational component of the advertisement because these two components 
were presented sequentially and the time spent on each component was under 
experimental control.  
Note the suppression of emotional reaction was manipulated with explicit 
instruction in this experiment. This procedure is typically used in the literature to 
achieve strict experimental control. However, consumers are rarely being prompted 
explicitly to suppress their emotions in the marketplace. To enhance the ecological 
validity of the results, experiment 3 adopted a less intrusive procedure to invoke 
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consumers’ emotion suppression. 
 




The stimuli and procedure of experiment 3 were similar to those of experiment 
2, except that emotion suppression was manipulated by varying the accessibility of 
marketplace metacognition. This experiment had a 2 (priming of marketplace 
metacognition: present vs. absent) x 2 (argument strength: weak vs. strong) between-
subjects design. Ninety undergraduate students participated in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit.  
 
3.3.2 Marketplace Metacognition 
 
In experiment 3, the accessibility of marketplace metacognition was 
manipulated subtly to induce/not induce participants to suppress their emotional 
reactions toward an advertisement. The logic behind this experimental procedure is 
provided below.  
Marketplace metacognition refers to the thinking about marketplace-related 
thinking, that is, the knowledge or beliefs that consumers may possess about the 
marketers’ motives and tactics to manipulate consumer responses such as emotional 
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reactions toward marketing stimuli (Friestad and Wright 1995; Wright 2002). When 
marketplace metacognition becomes highly accessible to consumers, consumers may 
attempt to resist the influence of marketers when they make product judgments and 
choices (Brown and Krishna 2004; Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Wood and Quinn 
2003). For example, Brown and Krishna (2004) manipulated marketplace 
metacognition by telling/not telling participants that a firm was experiencing financial 
difficulties such that it may go out of business if it cannot get customers to spend 
more money very soon. They then asked participants to choose between two options 
provided by that firm. One of the options was presented as a ‘default’, meaning 
participants would get this ‘default’ option unless they indicated otherwise. In the 
low-default condition, the ‘default’ option had a lower performance level and a lower 
price than the other option. In the high-default condition, the ‘default’ option had a 
higher performance level and a higher price than the other option. When participants 
were not aware of the firm’s financial difficulties, setting a high default option 
increased the choice share of the higher-performance, higher-price option compared to 
setting a low default option. In contrast, for participants who were informed that the 
firm had a financial problem, they were more likely to suspect that the firm attempted 
to sell them an expensive option to increase profit. Thus, their choice of the higher-
performance, higher-price option was not influenced by the setting of the default 
option. The findings suggest that when consumers become aware of marketers’ 
intention to influence them, they would attempt to resist such influences. 
Based on this reasoning, if consumers are aware that marketers appeal to their 
emotions through advertisement for the sake of inducing purchase behaviors, they 
may try to resist such an influence by suppressing their emotional reactions when they 
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encounter an emotional advertising appeal. Because marketplace metacognition is 
highly context sensitive, a priming procedure suitable for the purpose of this 
experiment was developed to activate the knowledge that marketers may manipulate 
consumers’ emotions for making profits, which subsequently should lead participants 




To prime marketplace metacognition, participants were told that their school’s 
department of marketing was considering providing a module on advertising design 
and would like to collect students’ feedback on it. Participants assigned to the 
metacognition-priming condition read about the description of the module, with the 
paragraph describing a topic on “appeal to emotions.” Specifically, regarding this 
topic, participants read that “…Appealing to emotions is an effective strategy for 
persuading consumers to buy and increasing firms’ sales. Studies show that 
consumers are willing to spend more money on a brand if they are touched 
emotionally by its advertisement. The module will discuss various advertising design 
tactics that can be used to trigger emotions in your target audience and enhance their 
purchase intentions.” It was expected that this description would make participants 
aware of the marketing tactic and prompt participants to suppress their emotional 
reactions when they later viewed the digital camera advertisement. Participants under 
the no-priming condition also read a module description on advertising design with 
the discussion on “appeal to emotions” substituted with “using graphics”, which 
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would not prime marketplace metecognition concerning emotional appeals. 
 To make the cover story more convincing, participants were asked to indicate 
their likelihood of registering for the module after reading the description. Thereafter, 
they went through a five minute filler task before moving on to the ostensibly 
unrelated advertisement evaluation task. The procedure of the advertisement 




3.3.4.1 Manipulation Check 
 
The manipulation of emotion suppression was successful. Participants who 
were primed with marketplace metacognition indicated exerting a greater effort at 
controlling their emotions when viewing the advertisement than those who were not 
primed as such (Mmetacognition = 3.73 vs. Mno-metacognition = 2.59; F(1, 86) = 12.95, p 
< .05). This difference was maintained across weak and strong argument strength 
conditions (F < 1; NS). 
 
3.3.4.2 Judgment of Image Quality Capability 
 
Findings on the judgment of image quality capability are shown in figure 3.5a. 
As predicted, participants who were primed with marketplace-metacognition (and 
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exerted a greater effort at controlling their emotions) reported similar judgments of 
image quality capability, irrespective of the strength of the product arguments they 
saw (Mweak-argument = 7.30 and Mstrong-argument = 7.43; F < 1, NS). However, when 
marketplace-metacognition was not primed, participants who saw weak arguments 
judged the image quality capability of the digital camera to be lower than those who 
saw strong arguments (Mweak-argument = 5.92 vs. Mstrong-argument = 7.23; F(1, 86) = 10.89, 
p < .05). The interaction between metacognition prime and argument strength on the 
judgment of image quality capability was significant (F(1, 86) = 4.36, p < .05). 
Additional comparisons within argument-strength condition showed that when 
the arguments were relatively weak, participants who were primed with marketplace 
metacognition judged the image quality capability of the digital camera to be higher 
than those who were not primed (Mmetacognition = 7.30 vs. Mno-metacognition = 5.92; F(1, 86) 
= 10.24, p < .05). In contrast, when the arguments were relatively strong, the 
judgment of image quality capability did not differ between participants who were 
primed with the marketplace metacognition and those who were not (Mmetacognition = 
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FIGURE 3.5 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 3 
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3.3.4.3 Product Attitude 
 
Participants indicated their liking for the digital camera and how good/bad the 
digital camera was on 11-point scales (0 = not at all / very bad to 10 = very much / 
very good). The two items were averaged to form an index of product attitude 
(Pearson correlation = .81). Planned comparisons showed that participants’ attitudes 
toward the camera were generally consistent with their image quality capability 
judgments (see figure 3.5b). Participants primed with marketplace metacognition 
indicated similar attitudes toward the digital camera across the argument strength 
conditions (Mweak-argument = 6.13 and Mstrong-argument = 6.19; F < 1, NS). In contrast, 
among participants who were not primed with marketplace metacognition, those who 
saw weak arguments had less favorable attitudes toward the camera than those who 
saw strong arguments (Mweak-argument = 5.17 vs. Mstrong-argument = 6.16; F(1, 86) = 3.45, p 




Using both explicit instruction and subtler priming procedure to trigger 
emotion suppression, experiments 2 and 3 provide converging evidence that 
suppressing emotional reactions may impair consumers’ ability to process product 
information systematically. These findings suggest that, even when consumers do not 
                                                        
11
 This directional F-test is equivalent to a one-tailed t-test, where F = t2; thus, the F-ratio reported 
here is equivalent to t(86) = 1.86, p < .05, one-tailed. For further discussion, see Keppel (1991, p. 
122-123). 
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wish to use emotion as a basis for judgment, their emotion (more precisely, their 
suppression of emotion) may still have an impact on judgment through its influence 
on the processing of product attribute information.  
The findings seem to be inconsistent with previous research on the use of 
feelings in judgments (e.g., Adaval 2001; Pham 1998). This stream of work did not 
show any effect of feelings on product judgment when participants perceived their 
feelings as an irrelevant basis for judgment. Moreover, the nonuse of feelings did not 
seem to hurt participants’ ability to form judgments based on objective information 
(for details, refer to the “utilitarian conditions” in the experiments reported in Pham 
1998 and Adaval 2001). This seeming inconsistency may be due to the cognitive 
requirement of the product judgment task itself. In previous research, participants 
typically read a short list of product features and the features were easy to process, 
demanding low executive cognitive functioning. Hence, even though the participants 
may have suppressed their emotions, they might still have sufficient resources left for 
processing the other product information and forming a judgment based on this 
information.  
This explanation was examined in experiments 4 and 5 to resolve the 
inconsistency between the present findings and the previous work. In these 
experiments, the cognitive requirement of the product judgment task was manipulated. 
It is predicted that when product judgment commands high cognitive resources for 
comprehending and integrating information, emotion suppression may eventually lead 
consumers to refer to their feelings when making product choices. The development 
of this hypothesis is elaborated on in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMOTION REGULATION AND  
CONSUMER CHOICE 
 
Making product choices may also involve the regulation of emotional 
reactions toward the products. Among the choice options available in the market, 
some have relatively higher product aesthetics but lower functional performance; 
some have relatively lower product aesthetics but higher functional performance. On 
occasions when consumers feel a need to suppress their feelings toward product 
aesthetics, they may believe doing so would place them in a better position to focus 
on the functional qualities and choose an option superior on functional performance. 
However, this research suggests that the implications from emotion suppression for 
product choice may not be as straightforward.  
 
4.1 COMPARING RESOURCES REQUIRED AND RESOURCES AVAIABLE 
 
Whether consumers have sufficient cognitive resources to judge the functional 
quality of a product depends on two factors—the resources available to consumers 
and the resources required by the product information processing task. Two conditions 
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are graphically presented in figure 4.1. In one condition, the resources required 
exceed the resources available. In this instance, consumers would have insufficient 
resources to make product judgments via systematic processing of the product 
attribute information (a condition that is consistent with those in experiments 2 and 3). 
In the other condition, the resources required for processing product attribute 
information do not exceed the resources available even after emotion suppression. 
Thus, consumers should be able to both suppress their emotional reactions toward the 
product and process the product attribute information systematically. 
 
FIGURE 4.1 
RESOURCES REQUIRED VERSUS RESOURCES AVAILABLE 
 
Resources Required 
Does Not Exceed 
Resources Available 
Resources 





























for emotion  
suppression 
Resources Required  
Exceeds 
Resources Available 
   - 58 - 
4.2 THE IMPACT OF EMOTION SUPPRESSION ON CONSUMER CHOICE 
 
Suppose consumers are going to make a choice between two options—one is 
superior in affective dimension but inferior in functional dimension, whereas the other 
is superior in functional dimension but inferior in affective dimension12.  In the event 
that consumers attempt to reduce their reliance on feelings toward the affective 
features of a product (e.g., product aesthetics) by suppressing their feelings, they may 
have their cognitive functioning impaired as a consequence. As shown earlier, 
consumers with impaired cognitive capability may be unable to evaluate the 
functional benefits of the options properly or make comparisons accordingly. This is 
particularly likely when the product function information is difficult or complicated to 
process. When consumers cannot base their product judgments on product attribute 
description, they may rely on their feelings instead (Bakamitsos 2006). In short, 
although consumers have started out with suppressing their feelings, they may 
eventually refer to their feelings, and choose the option superior in affective 
dimension. 
In contrast, when the processing of product function information is relatively 
easy, consumers with impaired cognitive functioning resulting from emotion 
suppression may still be able to properly evaluate the functional benefits of the 
options. With reliable judgments of product functions and reduced feelings toward 
product aesthetics, they would be more likely to choose the option superior in 
functional quality as they have originally intended to. 
                                                        
12
 The feeling toward products examined in this research is generated relatively rapidly and 
involves little higher-order cognitions. Thus, the generation of feeling is likely to be independent 
of the cognitive processes involved in evaluating complicated product attribute information. 
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Therefore, it is hypothesized that  
 
H3a:  When product function information is difficult to process, consumers 
who suppress their feelings would be more likely to rely on their 
feelings in making choices than those who do not suppress their 
feelings. 
 
H3b:  When product function information is easy to process, consumers who 
suppress their feelings would be less likely to rely on their feelings in 
making choices than those who do not suppress their feelings. 
 
These hypotheses were examined in experiments 4 and 5, which are reported 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTS: PART II 
 




The purpose of experiment 4 was to examine the impact of emotion 
suppression on consumer choice, and the way the cognitive requirement of the 
product judgment task moderates this impact.  
In the experiment, participants chose between two options of home audio 
systems. For each option, participants saw a picture of it and a list of its attributes. 
The picture was intended to elicit positive feelings toward product aesthetics, whereas 
the attributes described the functions of the option. To assess the different impact of 
product aesthetics (feelings toward products) and functions (functional judgments) on 
choice, the picture and attributes were combined in a way that a relatively high-
aesthetic design was matched with a relatively low functional performance, whereas a 
relatively low-aesthetic design was matched with a relatively high functional 
performance. A choice of the former option would indicate an inclination toward 
relying on feelings than functions whereas a choice of the latter option would indicate 
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an inclination toward relying on functions than feelings. 
The experiment had a 2 (regulatory strategy: suppression vs. non-suppression) 
x 2 (processing difficulty: easy-to-process vs. difficult-to-process) between-subjects 
design. One hundred and sixty-five students participated in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit. 
 
5.1.2 Stimuli Development 
 
Two pictures of home audio systems with a similar brownish color tone were 
selected on the basis of a pretest (see figure 5.1). In the pretest, 30 participants saw 
the two pictures sequentially with the presentation order counterbalanced.  They then 
indicated their feelings toward each of the options on three seven-point scales (1 = 
negative, bad, unhappy to 7 = positive, good, happy). The responses were averaged 
(Cronbach’s α = .90 and .88 for the low-aesthetic and the high-aesthetic options 
respectively) and the results showed that participants had stronger positive feelings 
toward the high-aesthetic option than the low-aesthetic option (Mhigh-aesthetic = 5.94 vs. 
Mlow-aesthetic = 4.49; F(1, 29) = 67.17, p < .05).  
The manipulation of processing difficulty was conducted by varying the 
number of attributes the participants needed to evaluate. There were two different sets 
of attribute description—one set for the easy-to-process condition and the other for 
the difficult-to-process condition. The number of attributes for each condition was 
decided based on prior research which stated that the processing difficulty may 
increase with the number of attributes that needs to be processed (Bettman, Johnson, 
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and Payne 1990; Campbell 1988; Garbarino and Edell 1997; Malhotra 1982).  
 
FIGURE 5.1 
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The attribute description for each option in the easy-to-process condition 
differed on three attributes. In addition, three common attributes were added to each 
option to enhance the product descriptions for realism. The common attributes were (1) 
single-disc CD player, (2) stereo speakers, and (3) two-year warranty. The differing 
attributes for  the high-aesthetic option were (1) audio features—support standard CD 
and Dolby digital codec, (2) FM radio tuner which works well in good reception 
conditions but may have a slight lack of clarity in less good conditions, and (3) CD 
recorder supporting CD-R/-RW. The differing attributes for the low-aesthetic option 
were (1) audio features—support CD, DVD-audio, and Dolby digital codec, (2) FM 
radio tuner which is suited to both good and less good reception conditions, and (3) 
stereo amplifier which creates smooth sounding and excellent bass. With this amount 
of information, judging the functional quality of the two options requires relatively 
low cognitive effort.  
The attribute description for each option in the difficult-to-process condition 
contained four common attributes and five differing ones. The common attributes 
were (1) stereo speakers, (2) with headphone socket, (3) with remote control, and (4) 
two-year warranty. The differing attributes for the high-aesthetic option were (1) 
single-disc CD player, (2) audio features—support standard CD and Dolby digital 
codec, (3) AM and FM radio tuner which works well in good reception conditions but 
may have a slight lack of clarity in less good conditions, (4) CD recorder supporting 
CD-R/-RW, and (5) limited edition. The differing attributes for the low-aesthetic 
option were (1) three-disc CD player, (2) audio features—support CD, DVD-audio, 
and Dolby digital codec, (3) FM radio tuner which is suited to both good and less 
good reception conditions, (4) stereo amplifier which creates smooth sounding and 
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excellent bass, and (5) free headphone. Evaluating these attributes requires relatively 
high cognitive effort for integrating the information and making comparisons. 
The compiled attribute lists and pictures of the options underwent a pretest to 
ensure they were judged as representing low versus high functional performance as 
expected. Participants in the pretest were shown the pictures and attributes of two 
options of home audio system. The order in which the two options were presented 
was counterbalanced. Thirty-two participants evaluated the easy-to-process 
descriptions and 30 participants evaluated the difficult-to-process descriptions. After 
reading the descriptions, they indicated their evaluation of the functional performance 
of the options on two-item scales (-5 = bad / low functional quality to 5 = good / high 
functional quality), which were averaged to form an index of functional performance. 
As expected, for the easy-to-process options, the functional performance evaluation of 
the low-aesthetic (high-function) option was significantly higher than that of the high-
aesthetic (low-function) option (Mlow-aesthetic = 1.92 vs. Mhigh-aesthetic = .83; F(1, 31) = 
17.52, p < .05). Likewise, for the difficult-to-process options, the functional 
performance evaluation of the low-aesthetic (high-function) option was significantly 
higher than that of the high-aesthetic (low-function) option (Mlow-aesthetic = 1.68 vs. 
Mhigh-aesthetic = .05; F(1, 29) = 35.73, p < .05).  
 
5.1.3 Procedure and Measures 
 
 Participants were told that the aim of the study was to understand how 
consumers make product-related decisions. They were instructed to imagine that they 
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were going to purchase a home audio system and encountered two different options. 
They were also told they would first see pictures of the two options, followed by their 
attribute descriptions. Next, they read instructions for manipulating emotion 
suppression. In the suppression condition, they were instructed to try their best not to 
have any feelings toward the appearance of the options. In the non-suppression 
condition, they responded to the appearance of the options naturally. Thereafter, 
participants saw the picture of each option one at a time, each picture for 10 seconds, 
and then the attribute description of each option one at a time, each description for 60 
seconds. Pretesting showed the time duration was adequate for them to finish 
elaborating on all the information. The product information was shown in this 
sequence (i.e., picture followed by attributes) instead of the reverse sequence or on 
one single page to ensure that participants had worked at suppressing their emotions 
before they processed product attributes, and that their attention to product attributes 
would not be taken away by the product pictures. The order in which the two options 
were shown was counterbalanced.  
Dependent Measures. After seeing information on the two options, participants 
indicated their choice as well as their relative preference. Relative preference was 
measured on a 12-point scale with a smaller number indicating a stronger preference 
for one option and a larger number indicating a stronger preference for the other 
option. For manipulation checks, they were then requested to indicate their agreement 
with the statements “I worked at controlling my feelings toward the pictures of the 
options” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) and “I found it effortful to 
evaluate the attributes of the options” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Finally, they indicated how familiar they were with DVD players (1 = not at all to 7 = 





5.1.4.1 Manipulation Check 
 
The manipulations of emotion suppression and processing difficulty were 
successful. As expected, participants who received instruction to suppress their 
feelings reported exerting a greater effort at controlling their feelings than those who 
did not (Msuppression = 5.08 vs. Mnon-suppression = 4.40; F(1, 161) = 12.78, p < .05). 
Participants in the difficult-to-process condition indicated they found it more effortful 
to evaluate the attributes of the options than those in the easy-to-process condition 
(Mdifficult-to-process = 4.81 vs. Measy-to-process = 4.27; F(1, 161) = 4.79, p < .05). No other 
effects were significant.  
 
5.1.4.2 Product Choice 
 
A logistic regression with regulatory strategy and processing difficulty as 
predictors and familiarity with home audio system as covariate was conducted on 
choice. The interaction between regulatory strategy and processing difficulty was 
significant (p < .05). The results are summarized in figure 5.2a. 
As predicted, when the product function information was easy to process, 
   - 67 - 
participants who suppressed their feelings toward product aesthetics were less likely 
to rely on their feelings and hence less likely to choose the high-aesthetic (low-
function) option than those who did not suppress their feelings (30.95% vs. 52.50%; z 
= 2.03, p < .05). However, when the product function information was difficult to 
process, the choice share difference between participants who suppressed their 
feelings and those who did not suppress their feelings was only directionally 
consistent with hypothesis 3a (39.53% vs. 30.00%, NS).  
 
5.1.4.3 Relative Preference 
 
Relative preference was measured on a 12-point scale with a smaller number 
indicating a relatively stronger preference for the high-function (low-aesthetic) option 
and a larger number indicating a relatively stronger preference for the high-aesthetic 
(low-function) option (see figure 5.2b). Consistent with the choice findings, relative 
preference was jointly influenced by emotion regulation and processing difficulty 
(F(1, 160) = 6.48; p < .05). Specifically, when the product function information was 
easy to process, participants who suppressed their feelings toward product aesthetics 
showed a weaker preference for the high-aesthetic (low-function) option than those 
who did not (Msuppression = 4.93 vs. Mnon-suppression = 6.65, F(1, 160) = 7.78, p < .05). 
However, when the product function information was difficult to process, participants’ 
relative preference for the high-aesthetic (low-function) option was only directionally 
consistent with hypothesis 3a (Msuppression = 5.84 vs. Mnon-suppression = 5.30, NS). 
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FIGURE 5.2 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 4 

























* Note: a smaller number indicates a relatively stronger preference for the high-function 
(low-aesthetic) option and a larger number indicates a relatively stronger preference for the 
high-aesthetic (low-function) option. 
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Additional comparisons within the regulatory-strategy conditions showed that 
among participants who suppressed their feelings toward product aesthetics, the 
choice share of the high-aesthetic (low-function) option did not differ between those 
who encountered easy-to-process product attribute information and those who 
encountered difficult-to-process information (30.95% vs. 39.53%, z = .83, NS). 
Consistently, the two groups of participants did not differ significantly in their relative 
preference (Measy-to-process = 4.93 vs. Mdifficult-to-process = 5.84, F(1, 160) = 2.22, NS) 
However, among participants who did not suppress their feelings, those who 
encountered the easy-to-process information were more likely to choose the high-
aesthetic option than those who encountered the difficult-to-process information 
(52.50% vs. 30.00%, z = 2.10, p < .05). Consistently, the former group of participants 
had a stronger preference for the high-aesthetic option than the latter group of 




It was predicted that consumers who suppress their feelings toward products, 
as compared to those who do not suppress their feelings, would be more likely to 
make function-based (emotion-based) choices when the product function information 
is easy (difficult) to process. The finding of experiment 4 provides support that 
participants who attempted to suppress their feelings were less likely to base their 
choices on feelings when the functional qualities of the products were easy to judge. 
This finding may be attributed to their reduced feelings toward the high-aesthetic 
   - 70 - 
option while still being able to recognize the functional superiority of the high-
function option. However, the finding for the prediction regarding the difficult-to-
process product information was not reliable.  
One potential cause for this unexpected finding may stem from the way 
processing difficulty was manipulated in the experiment. Recall that processing 
difficulty was expected to increase with the number of attributes used to describe the 
options. However, in the difficult-to-process condition, although participants were 
given sufficient time to read the attribute descriptions, those who suppressed their 
feelings may have relied on a reduced set of attributes as a choice strategy to simplify 
their decision process because of their limited cognitive capacity. If this is so, the 
hypothesized effects related to resource constraint may have been attenuated. This 
explanation, albeit post hoc, may shed light on the reason why in the difficult-to-
process condition, participants who suppressed or did not suppress their feelings did 
not differ in their choice of the high-aesthetic option. More importantly, if this 
explanation is viable, it would be possible to remove the unexpected effect by 
manipulating processing difficulty without varying the number of attributes. Thus, in 
experiment 5, processing difficulty was manipulated by varying the presentation 
format of product attribute information while keeping the number and content of 
product attributes constant. 
Although significant difference was also found in the non-suppression 
condition between participants who saw easy-to-process and participants who saw 
difficult-to-process product attributes, caution needs to be taken in interpreting this 
finding. These two groups of participants may not be comparable because they saw 
two different sets of descriptions of product functions. So the difference may be 
   - 71 - 
driven by factors that were not relevant to the examination of the hypotheses (e.g., the 
perceived functional quality difference between the two options in the easy-to-process 
condition may be different from that in the difficult-to-process condition). 
In addition, it is inappropriate to conclude from this experiment that the 
judgments of product quality and the feelings toward products are always independent 
of each other. Higher-order feelings may arise based on the cognitive processing of 
product information and the favorable judgments of product quality (e.g., Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 2002). Nevertheless, in the context of this research, the focus is on the 
relatively lower-order feelings which are generated via a quick appraisal of the 
appearance of the product.  
 




The purpose of experiment 5 was to examine hypotheses 3a and 3b with a 
different manipulation of processing difficulty. The number and the content of product 
attributes were kept constant across conditions, but the presentation format of the 
information was manipulated to vary processing difficulty. This experiment had a 2 
(regulatory strategy: suppression vs. non-suppression) x 2 (processing difficulty: easy-
to-process vs. difficult-to-process) between-subjects design with a procedure similar 
to that employed in experiment 4. One hundred and fifty-two undergraduate students 
participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
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5.2.2 Stimuli Development 
 
DVD player was chosen to be the target stimulus to provide some degree of 
generality over products for the investigation. Two pictures of DVD players with a 
similar grayish color tone underwent a pretest similar to the one reported in 
experiment 4. The pictures are presented in figure 5.3. Ratings provided by 30 
participants showed that the high-aesthetic option elicited stronger positive feelings 
than the low-aesthetic option (Mhigh-aesthetic = 5.13 vs. Mlow-aesthetic = 4.06; F(1, 29) = 




FIGURE 5.3  










The attribute description of each option contained four common attributes and 
four differing attributes, with the low-aesthetic option performing better in terms of 
functional performance than the high-aesthetic option. The differing attributes for the 
high-aesthetic option were (1) audio features—standard CD, (2) compatible formats—
DVD-video, DVD+R/+RW, (3) disc capacity—single-disc, and (4) display of digital 
images on TV. The differing attributes for the low-aesthetic option were (1) audio 
features—hi-fi stereo CD, (2) compatible formats—DVD-video, DVD+R/+RW, VCD, 
MP3 playback, WMV playback, (3) disc capacity—three-disc DVD/CD changer, and 
(4) karaoke function with two microphone jacks. The rest of the four attributes were 
common to both options and were added to make the descriptions appear realistic: (1) 
video features—progressive scan for high picture quality, (2) special effects—smooth 
slow motion and fast scan, (3) with remote control, and (4) two-year warranty. 
Pretesting with 32 participants showed that the functional performance evaluation of 
the low-aesthetic (high-function) option was significantly higher than that of the high-
aesthetic (low-function) option (Mlow-aesthetic = 3.28 vs. Mhigh-aesthetic = 1.83; F(1, 31) = 
71.79, p < .05).  
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FIGURE 5.4 






■       Video features: progressive scan for high picture quality 
■       Audio features: standard CD 
■       Compatible formats: DVD-video, DVD+R/+RW 
…… 
 




■       Video features: progressive scan for high picture quality 
■       Audio features: hi-fi stereo CD 
■       Compatible formats: DVD-video, DVD+R/+RW, VCD, MP3 playback, WMV playback 
…… 
Easy-to-Process Product Attributes 
Option A 
  
Summary of Features: 
Adopts progressive scan which produces high picture quality; has fast 
scan (forward and reverse); plays DVD-Video, DVD+R, DVD+RW; plays 
standard CD; has smooth slow motion (forward and reverse); single-disc; 






Summary of Features:  
3-disc player; plays DVD-Video, DVD+R/+RW, VCD, MP3, WMV; adopts 
progressive scan which produces high picture quality; has fast scan 
(forward and reverse); has smooth slow motion (forward and reverse); has 
hi-fi stereo CD effects; with remote control; has a 2-year warranty; 
karaoke with two microphone jacks. 
 
Difficult-to-Process Product Attributes 
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The same set of attributes was used for both the easy-to-process and the 
difficult-to-process conditions. The attribute information was presented in different 
format for manipulating processing difficulty (Novemsky et al. 2004; Stewart and 
Furse 1985), as shown in figure 5.4. In the easy-to-process condition, the attributes 
were aligned and presented with font Arial, black color, and bullets for easy-reading 
and processing. In the difficult-to-process condition, the attributes were unaligned and 
presented with font Lucida Console, grey color, written in prose format. Participants 
assigned to the latter condition needed to make more effort to comprehend, align, 
compare, and integrate the attribute information than those assigned to the former 
condition.  
 
5.2.3 Results  
 
5.2.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 
The manipulations were successful. Participants in the suppression condition 
indicated exerting a greater effort at controlling their feelings toward the appearance 
of the options than those in the non-suppression condition (Msuppression = 5.13 vs. Mnon-
suppression = 4.05; F(1, 148) = 19.22, p < .05). Participants in the difficult-to-process 
condition indicated they found it more effortful to evaluate the product attributes than 
those in the easy-to-process condition (Mdifficult-to-process = 4.46 vs. Measy-to-process = 3.88; 
F(1, 148) = 5.58, p < .05). No other effects were significant. 
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5.2.3.2 Product Choice 
 
A logistic regression with regulatory strategy and processing difficulty as 
predictors and familiarity with DVD player as covariate was conducted on choice. 
The interaction between regulatory strategy and processing difficulty was significant 
(p < .05). The results are summarized in figure 5.5a.  
As predicted, when the product function information was easy to process, 
participants who suppressed their feelings toward product aesthetics were less likely 
to rely on their feelings and hence less likely to choose the high-aesthetic (low-
function) option than those who did not suppress their feelings (8.11% vs. 32.43%; z = 
2.73, p < .05). In contrast, when the product function information was difficult to 
process, participants who suppressed their feelings were actually more inclined to 
choose the high-aesthetic (low-function) option than those who did not suppress their 
feelings (43.59% vs. 25.64%, z = 1.69, p < .05, one-tailed test).  
 
5.2.3.3 Relative Preference 
 
Participants also indicated their relative preference for the two options (see 
figure 5.5b). As expected, there was a significant interaction effect between regulatory 
strategy and processing difficulty (F(1, 147) = 11.90, p < .05). When the product 
attributes were easy to process, participants who suppressed their feelings showed a 
weaker preference for the high-aesthetic (low-function) option than those who did not 
(Msuppression = 3.84 vs. Mnon-suppression = 5.38; F(1, 147) = 6.42, p < .05). In contrast, 
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when the product attributes were difficult to process, participants who suppressed 
their feelings showed a stronger preference for the high-aesthetic (low-function) 
option than those who did not (Msuppression = 6.05 vs. Mnon-suppression = 4.59; F(1, 147) = 
5.46, p < .05). 
Additional comparisons among participants who suppressed their feelings 
toward product aesthetics showed that those who encountered difficult-to-process 
product attribute information were more likely to choose the high-aesthetic (low-
function) option than those who encountered the easy-to-process product attribute 
information (43.59% vs. 8.11%,  z = 3.89, p < .05). Consistently, the former group of 
participants had a stronger preference for the high-aesthetic option than the latter 
group of participants (Mdifficult-to-process = 6.05 vs. Measy-to-process = 3.84; F(1, 147) = 
12.54, p < .05) However, among participants who did not suppress their feelings, 
choice shares of the high-aesthetic option were not significantly different between 
participants who encountered the easy-to-process information and those who 
encountered the difficult-to-process information (32.43% and 25.64%, z = .65, NS). 
Consistently, the two groups of participants did not differ in terms of relative 
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FIGURE 5.5 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 5 






















* Note: a smaller number indicates a relatively stronger preference for the high-function 
(low-aesthetic) option and a larger number indicates a relatively stronger preference for the 
high-aesthetic (low-function) option. 
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5.2.4 Discussion 
 
The findings from experiment 5 provide empirical evidence for both 
hypotheses 3a and 3b. Experiments 4 and 5 jointly demonstrate that when product 
function information is easy to process, consumers who attempt to suppress their 
feelings toward product aesthetics would be less likely to choose the option superior 
in product aesthetics as per their originally intention. Paradoxically, when product 
function information is difficult to process, consumers who suppress their feelings 
toward product aesthetics may end up relying more on their feelings in making 
choices and hence be more likely to choose the option superior in product aesthetics 
than those who do not suppress their feelings. This pattern of finding may be 
attributed to whether participants had sufficient mental resources to suppress their 
feelings toward product aesthetics and meanwhile judge product functions properly.  
Participants were able to do both when the product functions were easy to process, 
resulting in a greater choice share of products that were superior in functional quality. 
However, when the product functions were difficult to process, participants who 
suppressed their feelings failed to form reliable judgments of product functions and 
eventually had to refer to their feelings when they were asked to make a choice. 
Processing difficulty was manipulated by varying the presentation format of 
product attribute information in this experiment. This manipulation may have affected 
participants’ feelings of processing fluency, which may then be incorporated into the 
evaluation of each option. However, as participants were experiencing this feeling (if 
any) when they evaluated both of the options, any difference in the evaluation of each 
option due to this feeling would be canceled out when participants chose between the 
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two options. Hence, the feeling of processing fluency can be ruled out as an 
alternative explanation for the findings obtained in this experiment.  
Note that the potential paradoxical effect is applicable, but not limited to the 
suppression of feelings elicited by product aesthetics. For example, if consumers 
believe that they will make more impulsive buying decisions when they are in a 
positive mood and thus attempt to suppress their positive feelings elicited by 
background music in a shopping mall, their product judgments may also be 
susceptible to the detrimental effect of suppression. 







This research has developed a theoretical framework explaining the processes 
and consequences of regulating emotional reactions toward marketing stimuli. Two 
important emotion regulatory strategies—reappraisal and suppression—were 
examined, each of which takes place at different stages of the emotion generative 
process. The cognitive impact of emotion regulation and its influence on consumer 
judgment and choice were tested in five experiments. These experiments were 
conducted with different manipulation procedures (explicit instruction and subtle 
priming), toward different marketing stimuli (product and advertisement), and in 
different contexts (product evaluation, advertisement evaluation, and product choice) 
to provide converging evidence to the proposed theoretical framework.  
Specifically, experiment 1 examined the emotional consequences of the 
reappraisal and suppression strategies and more importantly, the cognitive-resource 
requirement associated with the effective implementation of these two regulatory 
strategies. The findings establish the premise that while reappraisal requires low 
cognitive-resource input during the product evaluation process, suppression may 
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require appreciable cognitive resources. Since the pool of cognitive resources, 
especially the part serving central executive functions, is finite and cannot be fully 
refilled immediately after usage (Baumeister 2002; Richeson and Trawalter 2005; 
Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister 2003; Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005), 
consumers would have reduced capacity for processing product attribute information 
systematically if they suppress their emotions. This important implication was tested 
in the subsequent experiments.  
Experiments 2 and 3 examined the suppression of emotional reactions toward 
an emotional advertising appeal. The results showed that suppression may impair 
consumers’ capability to discern product argument strength presented in the 
advertisement. The findings seem to imply that consumers may be incapable of 
forming functional judgments based on product attribute information whenever they 
suppress their emotional reactions. However, this is not always the case. Whether 
consumers have sufficient cognitive resources to process product attribute information 
depends on the resources available to them and the resources required for processing 
the information. Experiments 2 and 3 focused on the situation where the resources 
required exceed the resources available. In contrast, under the situation where the 
resources required do not exceed the resources available, consumers with reduced 
cognitive capacity due to emotion suppression may still be able to make product 
judgments based on attribute information. These two situations and their impact on 
consumer choice were examined in experiments 4 and 5. 
Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that consumers who suppress their 
emotional reactions toward product aesthetics (compared to those who do not) are 
more inclined to make emotion-based choices when the product function information 
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is difficult to process. This ironic effect of emotion suppression on consumer choice 
may be attributed to consumers’ impaired capability to form reliable judgments of 
product functions. As a consequence, consumers who have suppressed their feelings 
may revert to their feelings for making product choices. However, when consumers 
encounter product attribute information that is easy to process, they may be able to 
both judge the product functional attributes and suppress their feelings toward product 
aesthetics. As a consequence, they may be in a better position to make function-based 
product choices as they intend to. These findings contrast the popular belief that 
people should be able to make more objective judgments by controlling their feelings. 
Instead, suppressing feelings may have a detrimental effect on people’s cognitive 
capacity to adjust their product evaluation with regard to a particular evaluation 
criterion (experiments 2 and 3) and to engage in online in-depth processing of product 
attribute information (experiments 4 and 5). 
 
6.2 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
6.2.1 Emotion Suppression versus Mood/Thought Suppression 
 
Note that the findings of this research appear to be inconsistent with those of 
mood/thought suppression research on the surface. Research on mood/thought 
suppression found that suppressing feelings/thoughts might increase the 
intensity/accessibility of feelings/thoughts (Wegner et al. 1987; Wegner, Erber, and 
Zanakos 1993). For example, Wegner and colleagues (1987) found that when 
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participants were instructed not to think of a white bear, the accessibility of white bear 
increased, and they were more preoccupied with thoughts about white bear after the 
instruction to suppress was removed. 
Importantly, Wegner and colleagues examined memory-based emotions and 
thoughts where the presence of suppression is demonstrated to inadvertently enhance 
the accessibility of emotional events/thoughts and the intensity of the corresponding 
emotional experiences. In contrast, this research examines stimulus-based emotions 
where the suppression process does not involve controlling the retrieval of emotional 
events from memory. Thus, the ironic reliance on emotions demonstrated in this 
research is unlikely due to intensified emotions but more due to the impairment of 
cognitive capability to judge product functions. Empirical evidence obtained in 
experiment 1 is consistent with the above theoretical distinction. Participants did not 
experience intensified emotional reactions when they did not have sufficient cognitive 
resources to suppress their emotions effectively, as their emotional reactions were 
primarily generated from the stimulus being evaluated rather than the emotional 
episodes retrieved from their memory. 
 
6.2.2 Emotion Regulation and “Rationality” 
 
One classic assumption is that emotion disturbs human rationality. 
Correspondingly, emotion and cognition were examined independently in earlier 
psychology research (see Cacioppo and Gardner 1999 for a review). In the belief that 
people can be more rational by controlling their emotions, emotion and cognition 
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were treated as two conflicting forces—when emotion is intense, it may outweigh 
rational judgments; when emotion is reduced, rational judgments may prevail.  
However, a growing body of research shows that emotion and cognition are 
closely intertwined (Phelps 2006). In line with this trend, the current research shows 
that attempts at regulating emotions may be cognitively costly. Fighting one’s feelings 
may inadvertently impair one’s ability to make product judgments. Thus, emotion 
regulation should not always be associated with rationality. The potential 
inconsistency between the intention (suppressing feelings) and the behavioral 
outcome (more likely to rely on feelings) seems non-rational (see Hastie 2001 for a 
discussion on the concept of rationality), although consumers may believe they would 




6.3.1 The Nonuse of Feelings and Consumer Judgment 
 
The investigation of the regulatory mechanism underlying the nonuse of 
feelings adds to the extant literature on the role of feelings in consumer judgment 
which has mainly focused on the mechanism underlying the use of feelings. The 
findings from the extant literature seem to imply that consumers rely on the objective 
product information to make judgments when they do not wish to rely on their 
feelings (e.g., Adaval 2001; Pham 1998). On the contrary, the current research 
demonstrates that the nonuse of feelings may not always be effortless. In particular, 
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the nonuse of feelings via emotion suppression may also have an impact on product 
judgment which eventually leads to emotion-based choices. This effect may be 
attributed to the impairment of cognitive functioning following emotion suppression. 
Thus, it is likely to occur when the processing of product attribute information 
demands high cognitive effort. So, besides failure to reduce emotional reactions 
toward products (Weinberg and Gottwald 1982) or inability to generate negative 
cognitions against positive emotions (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999), consumers may 
make emotion-driven purchase decisions as a consequence of emotion suppression 
which impairs their ability to judge the functional quality of products. 
On the whole, with an investigation of the nonuse of feelings, this research 
complements the previous research on the use of feelings to provide a more complete 
theoretical account of feelings and consumer judgments.  
 
6.3.2 Emotion Regulation and Information Processing 
 
Most of the previous psychology research on emotion regulation has focused 
on the significance of emotion regulation with regard to effective social functioning 
such as managing interpersonal relationships or reducing antisocial behaviors (e.g., 
Richeson and Trawalter 2005; Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco 2005). This research 
contributes to the emotion regulation literature by examining the impact of emotion 
regulation on information processing and providing insights into consumer judgment 
and choice.  
The findings also enhance our knowledge concerning the interaction between 
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the cognitive and the emotional systems, more specifically, in the cognitive 
consequences of emotion regulation.  
In addition, previous research has primarily examined the regulation of 
negative emotions or the regulation of emotion expressive behaviors (e.g., Richards 
and Gross 2000; Richeson and Trawalter 2005; also see Larsen and Prizmic 2004 for a 
review). Along this line, the current research suggests that the cognitive impact of 
emotion regulation is generalizable to positive emotions as well as emotional 
experiences (as opposed to emotional expressions such as facial expressions).  
 
6.3.3 The Differing Resource Requirement of Different Regulatory Strategies 
 
The findings regarding the differing resource requirement of various 
regulatory strategies may have implications for consumer research on self regulation 
(e.g., Baumeister 2002). Although the findings on emotion suppression are consistent 
with the theory that self-regulatory behaviors deplete resources, the different pattern 
of findings on reappraisal highlights a need to distinguish between various regulatory 
strategies for understanding their respective cognitive impact. In contrast to 
suppression, reappraisal consumes significantly fewer resources during the product 
evaluation process. Thus, it may be oversimplified to treat all forms of self regulatory 
behaviors similarly within a general resource-depletion model. An investigation into 
the different processes underlying different regulatory strategies may be helpful in 
deciding whether these strategies should be deemed as theoretically similar or not. 
Moreover, although previous research on how emotion and cognition interact 
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to affect consumer choice demonstrated that consumers tend to base their choices on 
emotions when they have limited cognitive resources (Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999), the 
findings on the reappraisal strategy suggest that consumers with limited cognitive 
resources may still be able to refrain from making emotion-driven choices by 
adopting an appropriate emotion regulatory strategy such as reappraisal. 
 
6.3.4 Implications for Marketing Practitioner and Consumer Well-Being 
 
From a practitioner’s perspective, marketers of high-aesthetic products want 
consumers to fully experience emotional reactions toward their products. To achieve 
this, they may try to constrain the cognitive resources their consumers have for 
product evaluation; for example, loading consumers’ mind with other information 
through an information-rich store environment. Under this situation, consumers may 
be less likely to successfully suppress their feelings toward products. Even when 
consumers manage to suppress their feelings, they may be less capable of judging 
product functions and eventually refer to their feelings when making choices. For 
marketers of high-function products, however, they should try to make their product 
benefits easy-to-process for their consumers instead of providing every little detail 
about how good their product functions are. Otherwise, even consumers who intend to 
rely less on their feelings may be unable to judge the product functions properly. 
From the consumer’s perspective, rather then being passive receivers of 
product information that is delivered by marketers, they may actively manage their 
emotional reactions toward products. For them, this research provides insights on the 
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effectiveness of different regulatory strategies under different circumstances. While 
the suppression strategy is readily adoptable, consumers may need to learn how to use 
the reappraisal strategy (e.g., examining a cute product in a technical way, evaluating 
a piece of chocolate cake from a nutritionist’s perspective) which will then reduce the 
emotional relevance of enticing products without placing continual demand on 
cognitive resources. Equipped with a repertoire of emotion regulatory strategies and 
knowledge about the potential ‘side effect’ of emotion regulation, consumers may be 
in a better position to make product judgments and purchase decisions that are 




Several boundary conditions to the effect of emotion suppression on consumer 
judgment and choice deserve discussion. First, the cognitive impact of emotion 
suppression is unlikely to emerge unless the processing of product information 
requires considerable mental resources for comprehending, comparing, or integrating 
the information. If consumers suppress their emotional reactions toward products that 
are characterized by few descriptive product features, they are less prone to an ironic 
reliance on their emotions in their choices. 
In a related vein, consumers may process product information at different 
levels ranging from mere pre-attention to high elaboration (Greenwald and Leavitt 
1984). The scope of this research may be restricted to judgments that require the 
elaboration of product information. Emotion suppression is unlikely to influence 
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processing stages that involve mere attention or a quick retrieval of previously stored 
information from memory.  
Finally, the findings of this research are unlikely to be applicable to highly 
deliberated choice situations where consumers collect and process product 
information over a long period and at different points in time so that their impaired 
cognitive resources due to emotion suppression may have been refilled. Rather, the 
findings might be most applicable to relatively rapid decision processes where 
consumers, for example, may attempt to avoid impulse buying by suppressing their 
feelings but still end up relying on their feelings in making choices.  
 
6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
There are several avenues for future research. First, research is needed to 
further reveal the mechanism underlying the choice share shift due to emotion 
suppression, as found in experiments 4 and 5. Tentatively, it is possible that 
participants may have constructed mental images of the appearance of the options in 
their minds and eventually used their feelings toward these mental images to make 
choices when their ability to judge product functions was impaired. This account 
awaits further research confirmation. 
Second, future research may examine whether individual differences in 
emotion regulatory style would influence the cognitive consequences of emotion 
regulation. As self-regulation may become more automatic and the regulatory 
capability may be strengthened with practice (Muraven and Baumeister 2000), 
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consumers who have a chronic tendency to suppress their feelings may be less 
susceptible to the impairment of cognitive functioning due to emotion suppression. 
Also, it would be interesting to examine what chronic or situational factors may 
influence consumers’ adoption of a plarticular emotion regulatory strategy (e.g., the 
marketplace metacognition investigated in this research) as well as consumers’ 
intuitions about the cognitive impact of different regulatory strategies.  
Third, future research may investigate the interaction between emotion 
generation and emotion regulation. The present research examines one way of 
emotion generation—appraisal and the corresponding emotional reaction. However, 
emotions may be generated through different processes which vary in terms of 
automaticity (Pham et al. 2001). Whether emotion regulation with varying availability 
of cognitive resources can be effective may depend on the process through which 
emotions are generated. For instance, it may be impossible to reappraise a stimulus 
which elicits emotional reactions through sensory experiences or conditioning effect 
since the appraisal process is not involved in emotion generation. 
Fourth, future research may extend the study of emotion regulation from the 
emotion-generation stage to the judgment-making stage by examining how people 
may adjust the influence of emotions on their judgments. This adjustment strategy 
neither alters real-time emotional experiences nor requires regulatory effort while 
consumers are exposed to the emotion-eliciting product. As a consequence, it should 
not affect consumers’ online processing of product information and the product 
judgments based on this online information processing.  On the other hand, the 
adjustment strategy requires consumers to identify and remove the exact influence of 
emotions on judgments. Since human beings often fail to properly correct the 
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unwanted influence (e.g., unreliable information) on their judgments (Wilson and 
Brekke 1994), the likelihood as well as the extent of under- or over-adjustment of the 
impact of emotions warrants further investigation for understanding the role of the 
adjustment strategy in consumer judgments. 
Finally, future research should examine the cognitive impact of emotion 
regulation in other contexts such as customer service and negotiation. Service 
providers may manage their display of emotions (e.g., smile) to enhance customer 
satisfaction (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993; Grandey and Brauburger 2002). 
Negotiators may express, exaggerate, or suppress their emotions strategically to 
achieve their goals during negotiation (Barry 1999; Kopelman, Rosette, and 
Thompson 2006; Levenson 1994). At the same time, the cognitive demands of 
customer service and negotiation are likely to be high. Service providers may need to 
exaggerate their enthusiasm or hide their unhappiness while providing consultation to 
consumers on the complicated product functions. Likewise, negotiators may need to 
conceal their feelings while pondering on how to acquire more value from the 
negotiation. Based on the current research, future research may investigate such 
situations where the regulation of emotions and the processing of information may 
compete for the same pool of resources and lead to unintended outcomes. 
 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although there is a tradition of associating emotions with irrationality, more 
recent research shows that emotions may serve as valuable, informational input for 
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judgment (Cacioppo and Gardner 1999; Pham 1998, 2004; Schwarz and Clore 1983, 
1996). The current research, in a related vein, demonstrates that emotion regulation 
may also yield its input for consumer judgment. In particular, while reappraisal incurs 
little cognitive cost, suppressing emotions might impair consumer judgment and 
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